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                   IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
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                    FOR THE DISTRICT OF VERMONT
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      MISTY BLANCHETTE PORTER, M.D., )
3
                           Plaintiff, )
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 5
             VS.
                                       ) CASE NO. 2:17-cv-194
      DARTMOUTH-HITCHCOCK MEDICAL
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      CENTER, DARTMOUTH-HITCHCOCK
7
      CLINIC, MARY HITCHCOCK
      MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, and
                                      ) Closing Arguments
      DARTMOUTH-HITCHCOCK HEALTH,
8
                                      ) Jury Charge
9
                     Defendants.
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            Continuation of trial held on Tuesday, April 8,
12
      2025, at 8:30 a.m., Burlington, Vermont, before
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      Honorable Kevin J. Doyle, Magistrate Judge.
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      Clerk of Court: Emerson F. Howe
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20
      Sarah M. Bentley, CCR-B-1745
21
       Registered Professional Reporter and Notary Public
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PROCEEDINGS 1 2 3 (The following took place in open court 4 5 without the jury present.) THE CLERK: Your Honor, the matter before 6 the court is Civil Case No. 17-cv-194, Misty 7 Blanchette Porter vs. Dartmouth-Hitchcock 8 9 Medical Center, et. al. 10 Present on behalf of the plaintiff are Attorneys Geoffrey Vitt, Eric Jones, and Sarah 11 12 Nunan. Present on behalf of the defendants are 1.3 Attorney Tristram Coffin, Morgan McDonald, and 14 Donald Schroeder. 15 This morning we're here for a charge 16 conference. 17 THE COURT: Okay. Good morning. So just 18 19 to confirm for the record that all parties have 20 received the revised copy of the jury instructions. 21 Plaintiff? 22 23 MR. JONES: Yes, we received it. THE COURT: And defendants? 24 25 MR. SCHROEDER: Yes, your Honor.

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THE COURT: Okay. So at this time I'll give you an opportunity, if you'd like, to kind of make any objections to the instructions as received last night.

I'll also tell you that you'll have another opportunity after the charge is administered to the jury to make any objections to the charge as given, meaning the way it was read.

But, if you would, I'll leave it up to you as to what you'd like to do to preserve your objections. If you'd like to say anything now, feel free.

Plaintiff?

MR. JONES: We have no objections to the proposed instructions. One I just wanted to address with the Court is we noticed that on the proposed jury verdict form there was a revision made of plaintiff damages, to strike the reference to New Hampshire law.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. JONES: And so I had understood from our conversation yesterday that there was a sense that enhanced compensatory damages were similar, not the punitive. They would kind of

be dealt with together. If that's not the case, then I do think now we do the enhanced damages instructions, if we're separating out. I think it could be very simple. We could put it right after the punitive damages section.

I think it could be as simple as, If you find for plaintiff on the New Hampshire claim, you may award enhanced compensatory damages for wanton, malicious, or oppressive conduct, something like that.

THE COURT: So you're correct that it doesn't address that, and that was -- first, there really wasn't much in the way of law provided on this topic. It seems like enhanced compensatory kind of came up yesterday, frankly.

MR. JONES: Right.

THE COURT: They weren't asked for in the proposed instructions from the plaintiff.

Some legal research done on it yesterday, maybe the parties are aware of this, but there's certain kind of questions that have been raised about the credibility of those particular damages in New Hampshire.

There was a federal court case from a few years ago, I believe it's McPatten, where the

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district judge in that case was addressing the application of this particular damages provision in New Hampshire and ultimately ended up asking certification from the New Hampshire Supreme Court on this topic. And several of the questions listed in the certifications order from the district judge I think are relevant from what we have going on here. It appears the case settled before the New Hampshire Supreme Court could answer the certified questioning.

So this was kind of my thinking at this point and on this -- is this a jury question, too, or is it a court question?

At least the plain language of the statute talks about how the Court may so, you know, frankly this really was omitted from the instructions because it just seems like there is a lot of unknowns about that. And the issue, as I say, really only percolated to the surface yesterday, and that's why it was omitted.

But, so with that said, is plaintiff then objecting to the fact that it's not included?

MR. JONES: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

Defendants on that topic?

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MR. COFFIN: I think the Court's approach to that is practical. There doesn't seem to be a lot of law on it, and the statute does speak to the Court decision.

THE COURT: All right. So I'll leave it the way it is. Again, if there is other authority provided to the Court, I would suggest that it is appropriate here. Of course I will review that, but none that you found and none was provided.

Anything else from plaintiffs in that regard?

MR. JONES: Nothing further, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

The defendants?

MR. COFFIN: We had just a couple brief items, your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. COFFIN: First of all, on Page 9, under the topic of corporate acts through its --corporation acts through its employees, I thought we had agree to an insertion of the term advisory Dartmouth health employee as to any. That seems to have not have made it into the draft.

THE COURT: To say that a corporation acts through its supervisory employees.

MR. COFFIN: Therefore, the act -- I thought we had agreed that the term any supervisory.

We had suggested, you know, management level or upper level and various formulations, and I thought we had landed on the modifier "supervisory" to be put in there, and it did not appear to have made it in there.

THE COURT: Right. So there's the question of -- you know, there's the question of liability for the corporation, which probably can't be premised on just the act of an employee versus an act of a supervisor. This instruction, the intention here was to make a much more general point. Corporations act through people, just in terms of corporate acts, which I see as separate from the notion of liability based on acts.

MR. COFFIN: Very good. I just raise that only as -- I wasn't sure if that was an intentional measure or not and, of course, it was planned.

THE COURT: Anything else?

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MR. COFFIN: Yes, briefly as well.

On Page 13, third line down from the top,
I thought we had said, agreed to again language
that we had. The modifier "suitable" position
in front of the word "position". Other
position, where it says there is no other
position. I thought we had agreed that the term
"suitable" was going to be inserted there.

I think that does track the statute and the instructions the Court would intend to agree. It isn't just any position. It's a particular kind of position.

THE COURT: Okay. I don't recall that being an agreed-upon change.

Was it, plaintiffs?

MR. JONES: I don't recall it being.

THE COURT: And then the --

MR. COFFIN: Okay, I'm corrected. We

don't think it was agreed upon. I apologize.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. COFFIN: But we would assert that that is an appropriate modifier.

THE COURT: Okay. So I'm going to leave that charge as it is.

Mr. Coffin, anything else?

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MR. COFFIN: Yes, one final thing, Judge.

On page -- on the mitigation of damages section, which begins on Page 30 and spills over to 31, this is all past in terms of if you find that Dr. Porter failed to do such-and-such, then which requires sort of a preliminary finding that she failed to do.

You know, our proof and our argument to the jury is that she did mitigate her damages, so that it's kind of a threshold question of whether she failed to do something or not doesn't necessarily come up in a way that's confusing to the jury. And we'd like some sort of an assertion there that says basically if you find the plaintiff mitigated her damages, that that should be deducted from the damages award.

And rereading some of the cases on our motion last night actually prompted me to think that I think that is something that is required under the law for the instruction to say something like -- just to make it clear to the jury that if you find mitigation, that should be deducted. And then, you know, sort of making them preliminarily find whether she did or did not abide by the term "mitigate".

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So what I would say is, you know, that last sentence above the punitive damages award, something along the lines of, If you find that she did mitigate damages, you may reduce your award accordingly.

THE COURT: So I'm just a little unclear about -- this argument was made yesterday, too. So affirmative defense in the case was failure to mitigate. The discussion yesterday about severance agreement and things related to that seems to suggest failure to mitigate.

What I'm hearing yesterday and today is that Dartmouth's position is that she mitigated?

MR. COFFIN: Well, it is, and that was clearly our position at trial because she got hired for a well-compensated subspecialty position at an eminent academic teaching hospital and was making, within a few years, we would assert, more money than she was at Dartmouth.

And so really she did mitigate her damages, you know, by perhaps 2021 but call it 2025, and Dr. Bancroft's chart, of course, having had her losses continuing on until her retirement age at Age 70.

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And so like our position is that she -it wasn't a question of whether she failed to or
not. She did mitigate her damages, and we
shouldn't be attributed to having those
continuing damages into perpetuity. That's just
not allowed.

THE COURT: Mr. Jones?

MR. JONES: Your Honor, I think that argument yesterday and today confuses an argument that there was no loss but the issue of mitigation of damages.

If they want to argue that there was no loss for those reasons that's one thing, but the proposed change in the language that they've made confuses the whole defense of failure to mitigate. As you mentioned, comes under the failure to mitigate. So I don't think it would be appropriate to make that position.

THE COURT: That is my concern, too. I'm just not going to make that change to that particular instruction.

All right. Anything further from the defendants on that?

MR. SCHROEDER: No, your Honor. We incorporate all of the objections that we put on

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the record yesterday, including but not limited to the case law relating to the ADA, specifically Section 12111 and the fact that an employer can only be held to a reasonable accommodation or reassignment to a vacant position, as the statute says and as the five circuit cases, including the 2nd Circuit, have said already.

THE COURT: All right. Well, then that concludes that portion. As I've said, you'll have an opportunity after the instructions are given to list any additional objections at that time.

Okay, and then I'll turn now to the plaintiff's motion to preclude any reduction of damages based on conditional offer of severance pay.

So having heard the arguments yesterday and considering this, I think that it would be inappropriate to comment on the severance agreement. To the extent I don't know what the defendants might actually argue so I can't really speak specifically to perhaps what the intention is. But would you like to let me know, or I can give you my thoughts on it first?

15 Mr. Schroeder? 1 MR. SCHROEDER: Sure, your Honor. I want 2 to make sure we're clear on that. 3 The evidence in the record is that C-13, 4 I believe, I'm certainly going to reference it 5 because C-13 was given after the meeting, which 6 7 arguably was part of the interactive process. You may recall Dr. Porter said, Well, I 8 set up a meeting with Amy Claiborne. She then 9 10 sends the May 25th letter, and then on May 26th she meets with Ms. Claiborne. And that's the 11 12 genesis of that. There's a couple things. First of all, 1.3 the severance agreement is admitted in evidence. 14 THE COURT: 15 Right. MR. SCHROEDER: And they didn't object to 16 it, and we can't undo that, unring that bell. 17 So I don't intend to discuss it in the context 18 19 of mitigation of damages --20 THE COURT: Okay. MR. SCHROEDER: -- but it's certainly 21 22 something that was presented to her, and she rejected it. 23 They can make their arguments as to why 24

she rejected it, that's fine, but the bottom

16 line is she asked for it in that meeting. And 1 2 in fact, the letter says that she asked for more 3 severance. THE COURT: Okay. 4 MR. SCHROEDER: And that's all wrapped up 5 in that chronology of events. She argued, and 6 this goes to lack of malice, et cetera, and also 7 just to intent, right? 8 THE COURT: Lack of malice. You said 9 10 this yesterday, too. So when you say lack of 11 malice, meaning that Dartmouth was making an 12 effort to reach some type of a severance agreement with her? 1.3 MR. SCHROEDER: Exactly, just like they 14 did with the other two physicians at the time. 15 THE COURT: Okay, but the argument during 16 17 closing is not going to be -- I just want to be really clear -- it's not going to be making the 18 19 point that if they should find damages, it's 20 going to be reduced by the amount of the 21 severance agreement? MR. SCHROEDER: No, I have no intent of 22 saying that, your Honor. 23 24 THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHROEDER: But I want to come back

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to the fact that this document, I certainly have the ability to discuss it as much as I want, I believe, in terms of admitted evidence into the record, and it relates exactly to the chronology of events.

It actually rebuts many of the things that Dr. Porter testified to. I never talked to anybody. Never talked to anybody. Well, no, actually you did. You talked to the head of HR.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHROEDER: So I want to know that I have free reign to at least talk about the document, not its import in terms of damages, but I do want to know that I don't have to go rewrite my closing to deal with the fact that I'm addressing — and I'm going to put it on the screen. Admit it an exhibit. We're not going to have a PowerPoint, but we're going to put in exhibits on the screen, and I want to make sure that I have full carte blanche to discuss what he said in that agreement.

THE COURT: Okay. I understand your argument. I appreciate that. Thank you.

So plaintiff, ultimately the memorandum concludes by saying the mitigation issue, it

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should not be -- they should not be allowed to talk about the severance agreement to the extent that damages are found to reduce the damages amount. So based on that proffer, what we talked about in closing, that seems then to be -- what's your view on that?

MR. JONES: No, I agree. Our request was that it simply not be brought up for the purposes of saying that there should be an offset or a reduction of the damages by that amount.

THE COURT: All right. So then it sounds like we have clarity on this.

Mr. Schroeder, just to be clear then, your discussion of the document, as you said in the ways that you have described, will be fine. We're just talking about the mitigation of the damages issue and the amount of the severance agreement.

MR. SCHROEDER: Understood.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHROEDER: Just on that subject, your Honor, and I don't want to put the cart before the horse here, but on the issue of talking about the cross-examination of

Dr. Bancroft, I realize we're not putting the chart as a demonstrative and it's not in evidence, but I want to make sure I'm okay to discuss, and I believe I am, the cross-examination and to the extent that he was asked to make figures that he may not agree with, but they actually show that if he did an apples-to-apples comparison, you know, she's actually making more at UVM. And that's really the import of that.

I'm not -- I'm not going to be putting any documents up or anything in that regard or even showing the numbers, for that matter. But that was what I understood you were saying yesterday, and I just wanted to make sure.

THE COURT: Yes. That was my intention.

Mr. Jones?

MR. JONES: I think that that's fine except to the extent that part of that cross-examination was examining Dr. Bancroft on the issue of whether he considered the severance amount and, if she had taken that amount, wouldn't have that reduced her damages. That was the genesis of our motion.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. SCHROEDER: That's a completely separate topic. We're talking about the issue of going to UVM at a 1.0 FTE as opposed to Dartmouth-Hitchcock, which is where he did his damages, at a 1.0, and then incorporates it at .75 magically in July of 2025, and so that's the issue. I'm not talking about the severance issue this in that regard. MR. JONES: That's fine. THE COURT: That sounds fine to me, too. Anything -- so you mentioned PowerPoints, so you're not doing a PowerPoint? MR. SCHROEDER: No, your Honor. The only thing we would show on the screen are admitted exhibits as I reference them and that's it. And just listening to me. THE COURT: Okay. Anything else from the plaintiffs to take

up at this point?

MR. JONES: Nothing further, Judge.

THE COURT: So just generally, talking more about the jury once they get the case, I just want to kind of give you a sense of kind of what I'll be telling them.

So in terms of how long they deliberate, you know, I can tell them or probably will tell them that it's up to them. If they want to deliberate into the night they can but they don't have to, is what I plan on telling them.

And that if they decide to kind of stop deliberating for the evening, they should send a note, let us know. I'll bring them back in, give them kind of the admonishments that I have been giving each day at trial; just about not talking about it, not doing any research. Also, not doing any research in the jury room, like those kinds of topics.

And then I'll tell them to come back. If they come back tomorrow, come back at 9:00 in the morning, like they would for kind of any other day. And then, obviously, the contact between all of us and them will be basically zero unless we get a note from them.

It will come as no surprise to you if I do get a note from the jury I'm not going to deal with it. I'm going to come back here and first talk to you, unless it's something extremely minor like can we have an extra notebook. I'll make sure they get an extra

Present on behalf of the defendants are Attorneys Tristram Coffin, Morgan McDonald, and Donald Schroeder.

We are here for a jury trial.

THE COURT: Okay. Good morning, Members of the Jury, and welcome back.

I'll ask you, as we always do, since we were last in court last week have you heard anything about this case?

Have you researched the case in any way, or have you spoken to anyone about the case?

Okay, I see no hands raised.

So, Members of the Jury, we're now going to be hearing closings arguments from the attorneys. And the rules, so to speak, are as follows.

So the plaintiff will argue first, and then the defendants will have an opportunity. After the defendants are done the plaintiff will have an opportunity to make a short rebuttal argument. In other words, the plaintiff has the burden of proof so the plaintiff gets to argue first.

Okay. Plaintiff, you may proceed.
MS. NUNAN: Good morning.

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THE JURY: Good morning.

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CLOSING ARGUMENT ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF:

MS. NUNAN: Dr. Porter's disability and her whistleblowing activities caused her to lose the job that she loved, the job that she held for 21 years.

When Dr. Porter heard reports of nurses, residents, nurse practitioners, ultrasound techs and other doctors, reports of Dr. Hsu and Dr. Seifer's incompetence, endangering patients, she had a duty to report. She spoke up often and loud. She hounded Dr. DeMars as chair of the department. She put it all in writing.

In addition, despite her best efforts to work as much as possible while she was recovering, Dr. Porter's disability made her extraordinary skills worthless to Dr. DeMars and Dr. Merrens. Quote, Everyone is also remembering Misty as a full-time employee, wearing three hats and not the one that's been out for almost 18 months, Dr. DeMars wrote.

In response to this and other astonishing statements in that e-mail about Dr. Porter's disability, Dr. Merrens wrote back that this was a thoughtful and appropriate insight.

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Individuals as well as corporations have choices when things go sideways. They can look at a situation and they can do what they can do to remedy it, to fix it, to make it right, or they can choose to double down on their initial position, deny responsibility, and find somebody to blame. Dartmouth Health had chosen the latter. Eight years has elapsed since it made the decision to close the REI division.

When you heard last weak from Maria

Padin, Daniel Herrick, Josselyn Chertoff, and Ed

Merrens, they were all the same lines. Closing

the REI division was the right decision in 2017,

and it's the right decision now. The decision

to terminate Dr. Porter was the right decision

in 2017, and it's the right decision now.

It was not the right decision. Dr. Julia MacCallum described in detail the harm that Dr. Hsu caused in the OR. Sharon Parent told you her moral compass was going off the charts when she watched Dr. Seifer perform the procedures. She had been in the REI division for 17 years at that point. Both women reported what they saw to multiple superiors, and yet Dr. Merrens still claims, I'm not aware of

actual harm.

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Dr. Hsu performed a procedure on Eunice

Lee six months and one day after Dartmouth

Health was in possession of Dr. Porter's 11-page
assessment of him, stating that he should not be
performing such procedures. He caused harm.

Dartmouth Health did not ask

Dr. MacCallum on the stand about the harm she saw in the OR. Dartmouth Health did not ask

Sharon Parent about the details of Dr. Seifer's harm in the procedure room. Silence.

Instead, Dartmouth Health dug up everyone who Dr. Porter has annoyed in the past 15 years. What did we hear? That Dr. Porter refused to use a paper intake form when there was a perfectly good electronic system available. She preferred her own tools and her own approach. She was abrupt with some people. Her standard of care was too high. She stood up to Dr. Reindollar. She did not want her schedule e-mailed to Dr. Seifer.

This is what Dartmouth Health chose to investigate and present to you. Not seeking out the patients who did not give informed consent to Dr. Hsu; not looking into the free IBF cycles

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that were given out to compensate for Dr. Hsu's mistreatment; not looking into the excessive pain claims or the statements by Dr. McBean that Dr. Hsu's surgical skills endangered patients.

The deal. Maria Padin described to us the role of the credentialing committee as verifying a broad list of qualifications about a candidate. She said when someone applies to be part of the medical staff, there's a process that you want to validate that what they say they can do and who they say they are is actual, and part of this is checking on their letters of recommendation from their last employer.

What we heard was that in the spring of 2016 Dr. Seifer did not meet this criteria. The e-mail sent to the credentialing committee by his prior provider stated, quote, I either had to fire the rest of the division or find a new role for Dr. Seifer because he was not going to be successful at leading the division.

There had been complaints about

Dr. Seifer. They could not comment on his surgical skills, but they did note that he had substandard ultrasound skills. Maria Padin admitted there were red flags.

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The members of the credentialing committee -- Maria Padin, Joselyn Chertoff, Ed Merrens -- should have denied Dr. Seifer the right to proceed. Instead, a deal was struck. The deal was that Dr. DeMars could hire Dr. Seifer, but she had to ensure his success. As Ed Merrens pointedly told Leslie DeMars; Dr. Seifer's success is on you. This put into motion, predictably, the inevitable coverup when Dr. Seifer turned out to have all the red flag qualities and concerns raised during the credentialing committee.

This shifted the responsibility of the assessment and the success of Dr. Seifer away from the committee onto Dr. DeMars. With her job on the line, who would expect Dr. DeMars to report honestly when she received almost immediate negative reports on Dr. Seifer's skills? They knew in the summer of 2016.

Dr. DeMars knew in July, 2016.

She reported in a private text; quote, I'm not sure DS is clinically competent. I don't know what he's been doing for 25 years, but I'm not sure it's IVF.

Eight weeks earlier she had been given

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full report on Dr. Hsu. Leslie DeMars did nothing to restrict Dr. Hsu or Dr. Seifer's practice. They were allowed to continue, until the closure of the division one year later, to perform procedures on women; women like Eunice Lee.

There's been a lot of testimony in the last two weeks, and there's a pile of documents that we've put together. My job this morning is to provide you with a roadmap to address the various claims and testimony in these exhibits. Let's get started.

I'm going to walk through the claims.

Dr. Porter's first claim is for whistle-blowing retaliation. She asserts she was not terminated and not reassigned because she reported conduct. She reported the conduct of Dr. Hsu and Dr. Seifer, conduct that she reasonably considered to be illegal, fraudulent, unethical and harmful to patients. To prevail on that claim, Dr. Porter must demonstrate the following elements.

One, Dr. Porter in good faith reported what she reasonably believed was a violation of law or legal rule.

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Two, Dartmouth Health terminated

Dr. Porter's employment and failed to reassign
her.

And, three, there is a causal connection between Dr. Porter's reports and her termination without reassignment.

The evidence Dr. Porter presented during this trial supports a finding in her favor of those elements. Here we go.

For number one, Dr. Porter made multiple reports raising concerns about patient harm and unlawful conduct that Dr. Hsu and Dr. Seifer were causing.

First, she reported substantial medical -- substandard, excuse me, medical care causing patient harm, including the fact that they were not following the ASRN standards. She reported procedures without patient consent. She reported there was improper billing going on and that Dr. Seifer and Dr. Hsu were ordering excessive testing.

Dr. Porter tried to stop Dr. Seifer from using sperm that was possibly contaminated with Zika. This was a situation that had been preventable from the start, and she tried to get

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Dr. Seifer and Dartmouth Health's risk management to follow the most recent Zika guidelines to avoid harm to the future fetus. These were the concerns that needed to be raised and addressed. When Dartmouth-Hitchcock did not respond, Dr. Porter blew her whistle louder and more persistently. She did not stop.

Number two. Dartmouth Health terminated Dr. Porter and failed to reassign her. Dr. Porter was terminated on May 4th, 2017, as you will see in Exhibit 50-A, we hope. Please look at the highlighted parts.

As evidenced in Exhibit 50-A, in April, on April 21st of 2017, in the plans listed, there is a column for the current staff in which Dr. Porter was listed as 0.4 GI ultrasound/REI. And then on the right hand, in the column that says future staff with complete REI shutdown, this is the scenario in which they put Dr. Porter, with 0.4 GYN/ultrasound.

Dr. Porter was already doing non-fertility IVF work, non-fertility REI, REI work, and she could have easily been reassigned to do the work she was already doing in the OB/GYN department.

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Exhibit 52. Dr. DeMars was annoyed and dismissive and discredited Dr. Porter's complaints. She wanted Dr. Porter to be quiet, but Dr. Porter was a thorn in her side. Dr. DeMars acknowledged in this e-mail, the highlighted part at the bottom, We could have offered her ultrasound-only position, but keeping her out of any real building plans would be impossible. She wouldn't be quiet.

Further, on the second page of
Exhibit 52, Dr. DeMars stated that her life
would be easier if Dr. Porter lost her license,
and her testimony at trial confirmed this.

Exhibit 89, Dr. DeMars states on the second page, on the second page, As much as it hurts to say, it was the right decision to include her in the terminations. I don't want to change that decision. If I had tried to make — if I had made a decision to try to keep her, I think that Heather, our new nurse supervisor, and our other administrator would have quit because she's tried to intimidate each of them and they are done with the behavior.

Dr. Porter in good faith reported problems to Heather Gunnell and Katie Mansfield,

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as reported here, the new nursing supervisor.

Dartmouth Health has tried to minimize

Dr. Porter's reports and complaints, but there

were other people that came before you that

corroborated Dr. Porter; Nurse Sharon Parent,

Dr. MacCallum, Dr. George, Dr. Russell, and

Ultrasound Tech Janice Gonyea. They all spoke

to the harm or the unconsented treatment given

by Dr. Hsu.

Dartmouth Health brings up during the trial this idea that there were complaints by others in the department about Dr. Seifer and Dr. Hsu, specifically referring to the feedback in the fall of 2016 and the spring of 2017, in response to Dr. DeMars's request for feedback. They keep saying, Well, these people complained, and we didn't fire them. They still have no explanation for why they ignored all of these people. And Dr. Porter was the one who persistently, persistently would not stop bringing these issues to the forefront.

The third element that I brought up at the beginning, making a causal connection between Dr. Porter's reports and her termination without reassignment. In Exhibit 60,

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Dr. Merrens brings up and admits that dysfunction was a reference to Dr. Porter's complaint. He brings this up in his testimony as well. Dr. Merrens says, Well, on the surface we are pinning the dissolution of our reproductive endocrinology program on our failure to maintain and recruit nurses for this work. It is ultimately the dysfunction of the physicians who worked in this area for years, as well as recent hires.

Dr. Merrens' testimony. He was asked, So you state it was ultimately the dysfunction of the physicians and ultimately a failure of leadership for which I hold Leslie fully accountable.

Closing the REI division and firing all the providers was an extraordinary act. It had never been done before.

In Exhibit 52 you will see that Amy Giglio says, We've never closed a service at D-H before. This was so extraordinary it can only be explained as discriminatory or retaliatory in its motive.

Dartmouth Health argued in its opening statement that it was a reduction in force and

that all three doctors were treated equally. This doesn't make sense.

Dartmouth-Hitchcock had two incompetent doctors that were causing harm, and they had Dr. Porter who was world renown for her ultrasound skills, her complex surgical skills, and she is the one that tried to stop the harm and clean up the mess created by others, but their argument is they treated them all the same. Talk about throwing the baby out with the bath water.

Wrongful termination under New
Hampshire's law. Dr. Porter also claims
wrongful termination under the common law of New
Hampshire. For this claim she prevails if she
shows, one, Dartmouth Health's termination of
her employment was motivated by bad faith,
malice, or retaliation.

Dartmouth Health terminated Dr. Porter's employment because she performed one or more acts that public policy would encourage. We submit that the evidence we discussed under the previous whistleblower claim also supports this claim, this common law claim.

Finally, I want to turn to the disability

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discrimination claim. Dr. Porter alleges disability discrimination, a failure to accommodate, and retaliation was in violation of several laws, including two federal laws, a New Hampshire state law, and a Vermont law. The claims are very similar under each one of these laws, so I will address them all at once.

Number one, under these laws an employer may not terminate an employee because of an employee's disability.

Two, in addition, an employee may show a violation of law if the employer failed to provide reasonable accommodation.

Finally, three, the disability laws prevent an employer from retaliating against an employee for seeking a reasonable accommodation.

The evidence that supports the disability discrimination. Dr. Porter testified that Dr. Ed Merrens stated three times during her termination meeting, quote, Stay out on disability, Misty. During his testimony Dr. Merrens did not deny the fact that he referenced her disability during that meeting.

Three. Dr. Porter told Dr. DeMars in the parking lot -- this is her testimony -- You

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could have kept me, meaning she could have been reassigned. Dr. Porter testified that Dr. DeMars said in response, I couldn't have because of your disability. That would have compromised your long-term disability. Dartmouth Health did not put on testimony opposing Dr. DeMars on this point.

You saw the testimony of Dr. Russell, who stood up and asked Dr. Merrens in the post-closure OB/GYN meeting why Dr. Porter had not been kept out to do her non-infertility work. Dr. Merrens referred -- Dr. Merrens' response referred to Dr. Porter as being on disability. Dr. Russell remembers this comment because she was the one that asked the question, and she was absolutely stunned that he would say that in a public meeting.

All Dartmouth Health has offered in response were witnesses that could not recall the statement. Further evidence of disability discrimination is on Exhibit 83. If you remember, Victoria Maxfield wrote to Dr. Merrens, asking why Dr. Porter could not be kept on for all of her non-infertility work.

In response to Victoria Maxfield's

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e-mail, Dr. Merrens writes, As you know,
Dr. Porter currently works at 20 percent of her
time. This is a reference to her disability.

In Exhibit 89, Dr. DeMars writes to Dr. Merrens, again, quote, Everyone also is remembering Misty as a full-time employee wearing three hats and not the one who has been out for almost 18 months.

On Page 2, Dr. DeMars writes, Misty's medical disability has been devastating, and I'm not sure that she should or will really ever be able to do the complex hysteroscopy or laparoscopy that she once did. That being said, there are few full-spectrum REI docs that could bring similar surgical skills, but they're hard to find. I think the best outcome of this termination is a chance for Misty to actually be out on leave with no intervening responsibilities so she can assess how much improvement she might gain. This is a clear reference to her disability.

Dr. Porter's disability was a significant reason for Dartmouth Health's decision to fire her and not reassign her.

I'd like to talk for a minute about the

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denial of reassignment and the denial of the interactive process.

When an employee has a disability, an employer may have a duty to make a reasonable accommodation. The discussion to explore the possible accommodation is called an interactive process. You will hear an explanation of this law.

If the employer knows or should have known that the employee was disabled, the employer is obligated to engage in an interactive process with the employee to determine whether the possible reasonable accommodation exists. Both employer and employee must cooperate in this interactive process in good faith.

We submit Dartmouth Health did not even attempt to participate in the interactive process with Dr. Porter. They brought her into a room and told her she was fired.

Further evidence of lack of engaging in the interactive process is, if you look at Exhibit B-12, Dr. Porter wrote a letter after her termination telling Dartmouth Health administrators that she was willing and able to

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work in other capacities at Dartmouth Health, and they would not engage in the interactive process.

There was no testimony by Dartmouth

Health witnesses about engaging in the

interactive process with Dr. Porter. There was

testimony from Dr. Merrens. He stated he did

not ask Dr. Porter if she was interested in

staying on in a non-infertility capacity.

There was the testimony of the following women: Dr. Julia MacCallum, Victoria Maxfield, Dr. Michelle Russell, and Dr. Karen George all spoke to Dr. Porter's non-infertility reproductive endocrinology skills and her ultrasound skills and her benign complex surgical skills that were needed in the summer of 2016 in the D-H OB/GYN department.

If you look at Exhibit 96, Emily Baker states that they had lost GYN ultrasounds, and it was very much needed and that the radiology department was no substitute.

If Dartmouth Health had engaged in the interactive process, the parties would have likely found a reasonable accommodation.

Dartmouth Health made no effort whatsoever to

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explore these options with her. This failure is a refusal to accommodate and violates the disability laws.

I want to talk for a minute about who the decisionmaker was. You have heard, and you will hear, Dartmouth Health said Dr. Merrens was the only decisionmaker. They assert that Dr. Merrens did not know about Dr. Porter's complaint of Dr. Hsu and Dr. Seifer or the details of her disability. There is evidence that disputes those assertions, and I will discuss those in a minute.

This argument does not help Dartmouth
Health avoid the liability for the actions of
Dr. DeMars. Both Dr. Merrens and Dr. DeMars
were senior administrators, and when they acted
they were acting on behalf of Dartmouth Health.
So if either took an action that resulted in an
adverse employment action against Dr. Porter,
Dartmouth Health is responsible. From this
perspective it does not matter who the ultimate
decisionmaker was. They both had the ability to
bind the institution.

Let's talk about the evidence. Let's talk about Dr. DeMars as the decisionmaker; the

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evidence that Dr. DeMars either made the decision or significantly recommended the termination of Dr. Porter.

Dr. Merrens attributes the decision to
Dr. DeMars. Quote, The recommendation around
the closing of the program and its staff were at
the recommendation of Dr. DeMars. You'll
remember that almost immediately after writing
this e-mail Dr. Merrens turns around and writes
to Leslie DeMars in Exhibit 89. He asks how to
better answer the questions that he's receiving.
If he had been the sole decisionmaker, why would
he have needed to ask Dr. DeMars?

In Exhibit 89 Dr. DeMars responds, As much as it hurts, it was the right decision to include her in the terminations. I don't want to change that decision. If I had made the decision to try to keep her -- and then she goes on to list negative consequences. This is the answer of someone who's made a significant contribution to the decision, if not made the decision itself.

Dr. Merrens, at the top of Page 1 in Exhibit 89, responds to these statements. He

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says, I think it's a comprehensive, thoughtful, and appropriate insight. Thanks for taking the time to do this. Ultimately, once the dust settles, we'll be in a better position with all of this, including Misty.

When shown his deposition transcript,
Dr. Merrens was asked if he had made the
following two statements. He acknowledged he
did.

The first statement was, quote, Leslie was ultimately the person that made the decision. And the second statement was, This was a decision we supported after looking at the information. This is further evidence that Dr. DeMars and Dr. Merrens were responsible for this decision.

Next we move on to pretext. Dartmouth

Health claims it had a legitimate business

reason to close the REI division, to fire all

the REI doctors and to not reassign Dr. Porter.

We maintain that this is not true.

The evidence presented in this trial shows that Dartmouth Health's reason is a pretext and that the real reason was retaliation for Dr. Porter's whistleblowing and

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discrimination based on her disability.

When thinking about pretext, you look at Exhibit 60. Amy Giglio responds to Ed Merrens on May 2nd. She says, Let's discuss this in the morning. I appreciate your candor and recognition of the issues. PR here is very sensitive, it goes without saying. We need to manage the internal and external message — messaging and issues.

So you're going to see a lot in the record of messaging, internal and external, and talking points.

This is the same concept used by Dr. DeMars when asked by Dr. Merrens how to better respond to the heartfelt messages he was receiving.

At the bottom of Page 89, Dr. DeMars candidly answers, quote, What's the talking point? My suggestion is we are working with each physician on their employment options as well as what's best for D-H and D-H OB/GYN. I don't know how you say, quote, I understand you're angry, but this decision was made in the best interest of the division and Misty. Even if it's the truth, no one will buy it at the

moment.

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External messaging and talking points.

What Dr. Merrens says in public to the public is spin. It's polished spin, but it's spin nonetheless that serves the best interest of the corporation. It's not always the truth.

How do you know that Dartmouth Health's reason is pretext? First, Dartmouth Health keeps changing the reason. This alone is evidence of pretext. Second, the reasons that they give are inconsistent. Again, inconsistency is evidence of pretext. Third, some of the reasons, like when COE Conroy says that it's due to declining birth rates, were reasons that even Dr. Merrens said were not true. Some of these reasons were just not supported by the evidence.

I want to talk for a minute about the evidence that goes against the idea that the nursing shortage was the official reason for closing the REI division. The list is long; my apologies.

Sharon Parent gave one year's notice that she was leaving. This was her testimony. That would have been in December of 2015. She told

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them it would take six months to train the REI division nurse.

When you look at the documents that

Dartmouth Health put in front of you about
approval of the nursing, you will note that
those documents are dated November of 2016; one
month before Sharon Parent leaves, one year
after she gave notice, or 11 months after she
gave notice.

It's Dr. Porter's testimony that she has knowledge of what the REI division has done in the past when they've been down on nurses, and she offers up solutions.

Dr. Porter also testified that the IVF nurses had specialized training, but there was a whole other group of nurses who could support the REI services that were non-IVF. Victoria Maxfield was one of those nurses. There were others.

Dr. Porter testified that only 10 to 20 percent of what the REI division did was IVF.

Victoria Maxfield testified that she was one of a group of nurses who supported

Dr. Porter in the non-IVF capacity in the REI division. She also stated until her e-mail,

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Exhibit 83, that during the past five to six years I have also been her GYN surgical nurse, taking care of all of her post-op patients due to the staffing issues in REI. Again, further evidence that other nurses were capable of supporting the REI division.

You've seen plenty of testimony that what Dr. Porter did was not just infertility work.

You also heard the testimony of Sharon Parent, who said she was willing and able to come back to work after her retirement not only to work as a nurse in the REI division but also to train and support less experienced nurses.

Sharon Parent said she had done her due diligence about how to return in a per diem fashion. She returned near the end of the 90 days and spoke to Heather Gunnell and Katie Mansfield but was rebuffed.

You'll note in Exhibit 23 that Dr. McBean worked -- Dr. McBean, who you'll remember worked per diem in the REI division, wrote a review of Dr. Seifer regarding his technical skills, his standard of care, and his leadership.

If you look at the bottom of the first page of 23, you will see that she says,

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Dr. Seifer was disrespectful to Sharon as she prepared for retirement. After Casey was unexpectedly let go, we were critically shorthanded. Sharon has both the depth of knowledge and the long-term clinical experience necessary to help solve this problem and train our newest nurse. She was willing to stay and help in a more limited basis but was marginalized and not encouraged to continue working. We are now in a crisis situation.

You also heard the testimony of

Dr. Merrens that he was aware that Sharon Parent
had offered -- he was unaware, excuse me -- he
was unaware of the fact that Sharon Parent had
offered and was willing to come back.

If you turn to Exhibit 60, please.

Dr. Merrens writes, While on the surface we are pinning the dissolution of our reproductive endocrinology program on the failure to maintain and recruit nurses for this work, it is ultimately the dysfunction of the physician who worked in this area for years, as well as recent hires, and ultimately a failure of leadership, for which I hold Leslie fully accountable. The fact that failures of such programs due to

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nursing shortages are not common and will be referring patients to a similar rural academic REI center in Burlington, Vermont will make our explanation to the public, patients and media, well, rather thin.

Dr. Porter testified that there were other -- there was a nurse from another unit that spoke to her about coming and working in the REI division. Sharon Parent testified that Leslie DeMars interfered and told her she was protecting her by keeping her from coming back.

I would like to turn to other evidence of pretext. In Exhibit 60, I just read to you a moment ago that Dr. Merrens wrote, While on the surface we're pinning the dissolution of our reproductive endocrinology program on the failure to maintain and recruit nurses for this work, it is ultimately the dysfunction of the physicians who worked in this area for years, as well as recent hires.

If you look at Exhibit 103, Dr. Merrens writes, Regrettably, Vermont Public Radio published an article yesterday indicating I made comments to the effect that the program was being ended due to interpersonal issues amongst

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the physicians. Nothing could be further from the truth.

Dr. Merrens also stated in his testimony that Leslie was the architect of the dysfunction.

Dr. Conroy stated that there were declining birthrates and that was the reason that the REI division had closed. All of these arguments are pretext for what was really going on.

They closed the REI division and terminated all of the providers as a clever solution to getting rid of three problem physicians.

I'd like to turn next to the damages section. If you find in favor of Dr. Porter on any of her claims, then your next task will be to consider and award appropriate damages.

In this case Dr. Porter is seeking damages to compensate her for her financial losses and to re-dress her emotional distress. In addition, Dr. Porter is asking you to award punitive damages.

Economic losses. With regard to economic losses for Dr. Porter, you may award damages for

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any lost earnings that Dr. Porter suffered in the past and any probable loss of ability to earn money in the future. You heard from Economist Dr. Bancroft. He analyzed these types of losses. We're going to pull up Exhibit 1-B, the chart.

Dr. Bancroft summarized his opinions in this chart. This is where he calculated Dr. Porter's losses by being terminated from Dartmouth Health. His methodology was relatively simple. He started with what Dr. Porter would have earned had she been allowed to continue her career at Dartmouth Health. Then he compared that to what she had already earned and what she was likely to earn going forward at UVM.

He made conclusions about the amounts

Dr. Porter would need to receive in order to be

made whole for Dartmouth Health's wrongful

conduct.

You may consider Dr. Porter's expected work life when calculating her losses. You heard Dr. Porter say that she plans to work until she's 70. That would be until 2033. If you find that testimony credible, then you can

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go to the bottom of the page, the bottom line on the chart and look in the far right column for Dr. Bancroft's calculation of what her losses are. As you will see, he calculates that figure to be 1,787,722.

When Mr. Coffin cross-examined

Dr. Bancroft, he suggested that if you changed
the numbers used in the analysis, then the
conclusion is different. That would seem
obvious, but that misses the point. Because if
you use accurate numbers, then you get an
accurate conclusion. I submit that Dr. Bancroft
used accurate numbers.

You have also heard throughout this trial that lawyer math is suspect. So when you hear about the calculator math done at the stand with Mr. Coffin's calculator and his framework, I would encourage you to think about whose math you want to follow; the lawyer or the economist.

Remember, when doing Mr. Coffin's calculation, Dr. Bancroft stated, I'll do it, but this is not correct.

Please show Exhibit 1-B, Page 4.

Dr. Bancroft prepared a chart showing the extraordinary expenses that Dr. Porter incurred

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by having to commute to Burlington from Norwich. To make her whole, we request an award to compensate her for those expenses as well. The amount is \$366,553.

Duty to mitigate. Dartmouth Health argues that Dr. Porter's damages should be limited because of what is called a duty to mitigate. You will hear that when someone is seeking damages to compensate them for losses, they have what is called a duty to mitigate damages. But this duty only applies to those damages that Dr. Porter could have avoided with reasonable effort and without undue burden or expense. She's not required to undertake extraordinary measures.

So in this case Dr. Porter had a duty to take reasonable steps to minimize or reduce her losses. The evidence shows that she complied with this duty by taking a job at UVM.

Dr. Porter testified she was on long-term disability and could not get a loan to be able to set up her own IVF clinic in the Upper Valley. The robotic equipment with which she does her complex surgeries are only available at big teaching hospitals at UVM or Boston -- like

UVM or Boston, excuse me. So for her to do her work, she had to relocate to either Boston or Burlington.

Being a 1.0 FTE, however, would require her to move. Dr. Porter testified that in order to keep her household running, her home in Norwich, she needed to be home at least one day a week so 0.8 was all she could handle.

She has deep roots in the Upper Valley community where she lives. The house that she and her husband built, her husband's multigenerational business that he runs in our community all made it impractical for her to move to Burlington, and it would not be reasonable to expect her to move to Burlington. She has done all she can to mitigate her losses. Dr. Porter maintains that there should be no further reduction in her damages.

You will hear from Dartmouth Health that she should have taken a 1.0 FTE job, but this would not have been practical unless she moved. And she's not required to move just to mitigate her damages because that would be unreasonable and an extraordinary burden and expense.

Two more sections.

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Emotional distress. In addition to damages for economic losses, Dr. Porter seeks damages for her emotional distress. You may award damages for noneconomic harm, such as loss of enjoyment of life, mental anguish, anxiety, humiliation, and other mental or emotional distress.

The following evidence was put on during this trial that Dr. Porter, indeed, suffered emotional distress.

I'd like to start with Dr. Porter first.

It was her testimony that being fired caused her to cry all summer. She was clinically depressed. She ended up grinding her teeth to the point she ended up with a tooth abscess, and that had to be repaired.

Being away from her family, the uncertainty of it all, having to drive to Burlington and stay in a hotel while dealing with all of these emotions by herself. She was away from her family, she was away from her Dartmouth Health work colleagues. It was awful.

All of this time she was still working to recover from her disability. It was pretty quite admirable, actually. You heard Julia

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MacCallum testify that she witnessed Dr. Porter the summer after she was terminated. You heard her talk about the crying. You heard her talk about the emotional turmoil. You heard her talk about receiving a phone call and Dr. Porter's state of mind after she returned -- she received that phone call.

Dr. Porter testified that she had been asked to walk a colleague through doing a HyCoSy procedure over the phone after she was terminated. The colleague had never done the procedure before, and it was -- a patient of hers was put on the schedule.

You heard Michelle Russell testify that
Dr. Porter would annually show up and pick
raspberries in her patch. She said that 2017
was memorable because Dr. Porter was crying and
try to wrestle with what had happened to her at
Dartmouth Health. According to Dr. Russell,
Dr. Porter was, indeed, distressed.

We leave it to your collective wisdom to determine the amount of damages to compensate Dr. Porter for her noneconomic loss.

Final section of damages is punitive.

Dr. Porter seeks an award of punitive damages.

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Punitive damages are meant to punish a defendant for its clearly outrageous conduct and stop others from acting in a similar manner in the future. You may award punitive damages if you find Dartmouth Health's conduct was outrageous. That means morally deserving the blame.

And if you find that Dartmouth Health acted with malice in deciding whether a corporation acted with malice, you may consider the actions of its managers who acted on behalf of the corporation. Dr. Porter submits that these standards have been met in this case.

The evidence of ill will and malice. In Exhibit 52 you saw that Leslie DeMars wrote, My life and messaging would be easier, and then a little farther on, if essentially Dr. Porter lost her license to practice medicine.

Dr. DeMars claimed to be a friend of Dr. Porter's, and yet she not only put this in Exhibit 52, she said it on the stand. She stood by what she said; that, yes, it would have made her life easier if Dr. Porter had lost her license.

Dr. DeMars in Exhibit 89 stated that she chose not to change her decision. Quote, As

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much as it hurts to say, it was the right decision to include her in the decision -- in the termination, and I do not want to change that decision.

Most disturbing are the comments about Dr. Porter's disability in Exhibit 89. The comments about the three hats and nobody remembering that she's been out. The comments about her disability being devastating and she needed to go away and figure out what she could actually do. The fact that Dr. Merrens responded to this; that it was appropriate and thoughtful insight. That's outrageous.

Also outrageous is the fact that the responsibility of the credentialing committee was circumvented; that Dr. Merrens told Dr. DeMars that Dr. Seifer's success was, quote, on you and he, therefore, created the incentive for Dr. DeMars to cover up the clinical incompetence and ignore patient harm.

The administrators of Dartmouth Health were put on notice of patient harm, and they took no action to restrict Dr. Seifer and Dr. Hsu from performing procedures or protecting patients from harm.

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Dr. Merrens testified that Dartmouth

Health offered Dr. Hsu and Dr. Seifer placement
services after being terminated to help them

find now employment. He passed the problem
along.

Daniel Herrick testified that they did not fire doctors for cause but closed the division instead. For the women who were harmed, like Eunice Lee, for the women with the procedure without consent, and for the woman who was impregnated with a thyroid problem who lost her baby, these were all outcomes that we submit could have been prevented. That's outrageous.

Dr. DeMars, in her FPTE of Dr. Seifer, whitewashed all of Dr. Porter's comments. She used Dr. Hsu to evaluate Dr. Seifer when he clearly -- when she clearly had information in the 11-page assessment that he should not be doing the procedures himself. She used him to assess Dr. Seifer, and the credentialing committee allowed it.

In the summer of 2016 you had an 11-page assessment of Dr. Hsu by Dr. Porter stating that he could not do this work, and you had a text message on July 28 from Leslie DeMars stating

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that Dr. Seifer was clinically incompetent. And yet they allowed these individuals to perform procedures on women for the following year.

This is outrageous.

These women were paying out-of-pocket and were desperate to get pregnant. You saw in one of those e-mails where Dr. Porter was pointing out how poor the pregnancy rates were for 2016.

If you decide that it was the right decision, if you decide that Dr. Porter -- I'm sorry, excuse me. If you decide that these statements, this evidence is outrageous, you can award punitive damages.

Conclusion. Finally.

Dartmouth Health had a choice as to how it handled the REI division issues and closure. It chose what probably seemed at the time as a clever solution. There were consequences to these choices. There was harm caused to patients. There was harm caused to the community.

I keep coming back to the testimony of

Daniel Herrick. Why are we applying car

manufacturer processes to women's healthcare?

Daniel Herrick could not tell you how many women

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and girls his decisions impacted. Where does that leave you?

When you go back to the jury room to deliberate, this becomes your case, too. This is where you get to write the final chapter.

You get to decide what happened, who you believe, and what harm was caused. Then you get to decide an appropriate remedy for Dr. Porter.

Unfortunately this case does not give you an opportunity to remedy the harm to patients, but you do have a chance to make Dartmouth

Health think twice before it turns the other way the next time patients receives -- it receives reports of harm by its medical staff.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. At this time we'll just take a very brief five-minute restroom break, and we'll come back for the next statement.

THE CLERK: All rise for the jury.

(The jury left the courtroom at

10:10 a.m.)

THE CLERK: Please be seated.

(A recess was taken from 10:11 a.m. to

10:20 a.m.)

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1	THE CLERK: All rise.
2	(The judge entered the courtroom.)
3	THE CLERK: Please be seated.
4	(Brief pause.)
5	THE CLERK: All rise for the jury.
6	(The jury entered the courtroom at
7	10:20 a.m.)
8	THE CLERK: Please be seated.
9	THE COURT: Defense make their closing
10	argument.
11	MR. SCHROEDER: Thank you, your Honor.
12	(Brief pause.)
13	MR. SCHROEDER: Emerson, may I have
14	control of the exhibits?
15	Thank you.
16	CLOSING ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF DEFENSE:
17	MR. SCHROEDER: Good morning. First I
18	want to say a few words of thanks. Thank you
19	for your attention this entire two weeks, two
20	and a half weeks, and I'm sure it seems to you
21	that it has been a very long time. And it has.
22	We've had 20 witnesses; 21, 20 witnesses,
23	90 exhibits. On behalf of my client and on
24	behalf of Laurie and Ray and Tris and Ed and
25	Megan, we really appreciate your time and

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attention to everything. You've been extremely attentive, and we really appreciate that.

So I only get one chance to talk. You may actually like that, I don't know, but it's one; one and done. Kind of like the NC double A tournament.

Members of the jury, you've heard a great deal over the course of this trial, most recently some very emotional testimony from a patient who took the stand and shared a deeply personal and painful experience. But her testimony, like the testimony of Dr. Ira Bernstein, related to topics that are not pertinent to the actual claims in this case.

You'll hear the jury instructions from Judge Doyle. I'm not going to go through all of the elements of each claim. You'll have a chance to match the facts in the case to the law.

But I want you to remember that that individual's testimony, as well as the testimony of Dr. Ira Bernstein, related to topics that are not related to this case.

This is an employment discrimination and retaliation case. It is not a medical

malpractice case. And while counsel for Dr. Porter had attempted to distract from the actual issues by presenting evidence that is designated to elicit sympathy and fear, this is quite frankly an emotional Hail Mary and a shameless attempt by Dr. Porter to leverage a patient's difficult fertility journey for her own financial gain.

What's more, Dr. Porter has flooded the record with evidence of how talented she is as a surgeon, despite the fact that Dartmouth Health has never asserted anything to the contrary. In fact, there were lots of testimony by Dr. Porter and her friends; Dr. Russell, Sharon Parent, Dr. MacCallum about how Dr. Porter was such a skilled surgeon.

I want to harken back to my opening statement. We didn't dispute it then. We don't dispute it now. She is a talented surgeon, but that is not the whole calculus for determining who is a great provider in a system where you have to work with people day in and day out. Different people and different titles, different positions and different departments.

Everyone must remember why we're here.

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This is a case about employment decisions, about whether Dartmouth Health wrongfully terminated Dr. Porter, retaliated against her for whistleblowing, or discriminated against her because of her disability.

And while Dr. Porter has brought witnesses to the stand who have evoked emotion and stirred sympathy, the stories they've told don't provide any evidence to support her disability discrimination and retaliation claims. They are not connected to the legal questions before you.

Because at the end of the day you are going to be asked to marry the facts to the law. That is going to be your duty. And with care and respect, I suggest to you that some of the emotional testimony, however genuine, draws focus away from the core issues before you.

And on those issues it's our position that the plaintiff has failed, simply failed to present sufficient evidence to meet her burden of proof. And you'll hear about the burden of proof and the standard for that.

The plaintiff has the burden on all of her claims, we submit, based upon the record in

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this case after two weeks of testimony, 20 witnesses, 90 exhibits, that she fails to meet her burden of proof.

And let me just say a few words about the showing of exhibits that you saw before. I counted seven, I think. There are multiple iterations or multiple references to a number of exhibits. There are only seven references in the closing statement by Ms. Nunan. However, there are 90 exhibits in this case, and we want you to take a look at them. And look at the totality of the circumstances.

Now, one thing that Mr. Nunan didn't mention in her closing is really the ballgame here. It's credibility. It's credibility of the witnesses, and that is all within your domain. You get to determine the credibility of the witnesses. You've been with us for two weeks, over two weeks. During that time you've heard from a whole range of witnesses, and no doubt you've made assessments about whether you found them credible. Because credibility is everything in this case.

And I'd like to take some time now to review the testimony of a few key witnesses as

it relates to credibility.

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Let me start with Dr. Porter. As you heard from both Dr. Porter's witnesses and Dartmouth Health witnesses, including Dr. DeMars, Dr. Porter is a very smart, very talented, has the potential to -- potential to be a great provider.

However, you also heard from both
Dartmouth Health's witnesses and Dr. Porter's
witnesses she is not a team player and is not
someone who could be relied on to put her needs
over the group or the team. Not surprisingly,
she might have a fairly large ego and can be
thin-skinned, manipulative, and demanding.
These characteristics work against an effective
team. As a result, Dr. Porter simply could not
be the leader of the REI division.

Indeed, Richard Reindollar, the former chair of the OB/GYN division, who then became the chair of the ASRN, indeed told Leslie DeMars in no uncertain terms that making Dr. Porter the director of the REI division would be a mistake.

This is way before Dr. Hsu and Dr. Seifer got there. And you may recall we went through the chronology of events in very good detail,

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and we did that because the timing of events and the chronology of events is important for you to understand.

Dr. Reindollar made his assessment long before Dr. Porter developed her brain injury and long before she made complaints about Dr. Hsu and Seifer. Her personality characteristics and not her disability led her superiors at Dartmouth Health to consistently judge her incapable of carrying the responsibility of moving the REI division forward in a leadership role. That was back in 2012, 2013.

Indeed, after testifying on direct examination pursuant to a carefully drafted script, we saw an indication of Dr. Porter's true personality on cross-examination. To say she was combative would probably be an understatement.

This was even the case when I even asked Dr. Porter about noncontroversial topics. She said, quote, I would not characterize it that way, end quote, 36 times. I thought it was more, but we checked the record.

After viewing that testimony, I hope you asked yourselves just a few simple questions.

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Would you want to work with this person? Do you think this person is a team player? Do you think there is any setting in which Dr. Porter would view her colleagues as being competent?

I recall that Dr. Porter's own witness,
Dr. Ira Bernstein, testified that Dr. Porter was
continuing to complain and criticize her
colleagues even now that she's at an entirely
new hospital. And at the end of the day this
case comes down to credibility, and Dr. Porter
simply is not credible.

And, remember, you say a number of exhibits, and they were shown to you multiple times in Ms. Nunan's closing statement. Why? Because that's all they had is a handful of exhibits. You've got to look at all the testimony, all of the exhibits in the case and make your determination on credibility.

What about Leslie DeMars, who's chair of the OB/GYN department? Dr. Porter denied that she was ever friends with Dr. DeMars and refused to even acknowledge that they were anything beyond collegial co-workers, but the evidence revealed the following. They texted regularly. Their children played together. Their boys did

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Boy Scouts. They bought the same fancy luxury cars. Dr. Porter went above and beyond to help Dr. DeMars get pregnant with her second son. That was a personal fact that Dr. DeMars was willing to share with you.

And on top of all that, they shared -they went away every single year for 10 to
15 years and shared a hotel room. You know, who
does that if they're not really close friends?
By the way, I wouldn't do that with my close
friends. I'm not sure about you.

As Dr. DeMars testified, Dr. Porter was the kind of friend she would have called at 4:00 a.m. in the event of an emergency.

When I asked her about Dr. Seifer and Dr. Hsu, she testified she had no personal issues with Albert Hsu or David Seifer. More specifically, she stated the following. Once again, this comes down to what was the witness testimony and what were the documents that were put in front of you.

What did she say? I wasn't aware of any infighting in REI at all. There were no personal issues in terms of infighting. I would not characterize it as conflict. I got along

with them, yes.

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And you may recall she said, My complaints about Dr. Hsu brought me no joy. She said that multiple times, and I just want you to remember what was said and testified to in determining the credibility of the witnesses.

But Dr. Porter could not deny the text messages where she told her now UVM colleague, Lisa McGee, that she hoped Albert Hsu would fail his Boards. She said Dr. Seifer was insane and Albert Hsu was pompous and not as bright as he thinks he is. Hearing him pontificate about his research would be torture.

Dr. Porter testified that she was completely taken aback by the closure of the REI division. Remember when I asked her that?

Really?

Exhibit C-6-A is an excerpt of
Misty Porter's text messages. Dr. Porter was
trading text messages with Lisa McGee at UVM
about a potential position at UVM Medical Center
on April 13th. We went through all of the
chronology of this case because chronology of
events matters, and when things happened
matters.

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On April 13th, almost three weeks before she was notified that the REI division was being closed, Lisa McGee says to her, Do what you need to do but leave some time to come talk with us before you make any solid plans.

And then one day after the REI division closure, on May 5th, 2017; so the REI division closure is announced May 4th, then you have May 5th. Lisa McGee texted Misty to say the following: Hi, Misty. I spoke with Ira. We all know who Ira is at this point.

I spoke with Ira this morning, and he agreed. If you wanted, we could do a per diem arrangement pretty quickly for June. This could give you some breathing room to have time to think things through and make longer-term decisions. You could start later, too. No strings attached for longer term so you could still take the Boston option if it suites your needs better. We are here for you.

Dr. Porter couldn't remember exactly what the Boston option was.

What about Dr. Merrens? Obviously I told you upfront that Dr. Merrens was going to be here for the entire of the trial with all of

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you, and I submit on the opposite end of the credibility spectrum is where Dr. Merrens sits. He testified on two different dates. He was consistent. He was articulate. He was frankly believable. And make no mistake about it, Dr. Merrens made the decision to close the REI division and terminate Dr. Porter's employment.

Now, why is that important? Because at the time that he made the decision he had no knowledge of either the specific nature of Dr. Porter's disability or the complaints she raised about Dr. Hsu and Dr. Seifer.

In fact, there's no evidence in the record to the contrary, and that's what this case comes down to; the evidence in the record.

You've been presented with a whole lot of information in this case, but I'll represent to you that this information is the most critical of everything that you have heard. How could Dr. Merrens possibly have discriminated or retaliated against Dr. Porter if he didn't have any specific knowledge of it in the first place?

And remember, the REI division, the REI division was closed. First time they've ever closed a division in the entirety of Dartmouth

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Health's history, as far as anybody can testify to. There was no -- there was no dispute about that. And three positions were fired all at the same time. They were let go.

Now, how you judge Dr. Merrens' intentions? And Ms. Nunan glossed over these exhibits, but I would ask that you please review them when you're back in the deliberation room.

Exhibits B, C and D. Easy to remember.

When Misty -- Misty Porter was involved in a dispute with a former chair of the OB/GYN department, Richard Reindollar, back in 2012 and 2013, she thought that Dr. Merrens was helpful, respectful, a good sounding board to address her conflicts with Dr. Reindollar. Her e-mail responses demonstrate that he was a caring, thoughtful, and solid leader then and as well as further on down the line, three and a half years later. He helped her back then.

She never approached him again after that. They didn't stay in contact over the next three and a half years, but she certainly knew that she could go to him as a neutral sounding board.

Let me review a few of the key events

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here. We went -- there was a lot of testimony on a number of these key issues, and this goes to the heart of the case. Dr. Porter cannot overcome several undisputed facts, which are fatal to her claims of whistleblower retaliation and disability discrimination.

Remember, the REI division closed, permanently closed in May of 2017. That was eight years ago. Almost eight years ago.

Dartmouth Health announced the closure of its REI division in early May, 2017. Multiple people testified this was the first time that it had ever happened. There's no -- there's no dispute about that.

Well, Dr. Porter apparently believes that this first-of-its-kind closure, which involves the termination of multiple positions, not just herself, came after a series of formal and informal attempts to fix the REI division.

What you heard from Ms. Nunan is their case. Well, this was a big reach. This was a big conspiracy. Really what they were trying to do was terminate Dr. Porter, and so they concocted this big scheme of shutting down a division, which they had never done before, in

order to get rid of Dr. Porter.

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And what you heard was -- from

Dr. Merrens was this was a tough business

decision made by Dartmouth Health's chief

clinical officer. That's part of his job

responsibilities in running a healthcare system.

This was not an overnight decision, and it

impacted a number of people internally and

externally as well. He understood the gravity

of the decision, and he made these decisions

even though they're unpopular.

To suggest that all of this was done just to target Dr. Porter is another example of her ego getting in the way. This was not about her. Three physicians were terminated; Dr. Seifer, the division director, Dr. Misty Porter, Dr. Albert Hsu. All three positions were terminated one month after notice of its closure. Each of them was offered a severance package.

When Dr. Porter asked her for severance they gave it to her. Nine months of her base salary; \$228,000.

If we could bring up C-13.

You may recall the testimony about this

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time of events, this sequence of events. There was the May 25th letter from Dr. Porter to a series of individuals. She said, Well, I never talked to anybody from Dartmouth Health. I never reached out to them. I never heard from them.

Well, when you see this letter there's a couple of really important things in it.

Number one, Dr. -- Ms. Giglio, her name is now Claiborne, Amy Claiborne says, This letter serves as a response to your letter dated May 25th, 2015, and questions posed during our meeting together with your husband on Friday, May 26th.

She also says to her she'd like to thank her for her accomplishments and also let's her know that, I reviewed your request with clinical and operational leadership, and this related to wanting to reconsider her employment termination date. And she's informed that, no, they can't do that.

But then she says, In addition -- and this is in the fourth full paragraph -- in our meeting you had requested an increase in the severance amount. After considering this

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request, D-H is willing to extend severance to 36 weeks of severance. That was offered to her. That shows Dartmouth Health's intent.

Actually the amount of money, or I should say the number of months was certainly more than the other two positions received.

And remember, again, Dartmouth Health hasn't reopened this division, nor does it have any current plans to do so. The closure is now almost eight years ago. So any speculation that this closure was like a short-term fix to get rid of Dr. Porter and then, well, we can go back and open the REI division, that still hasn't happened eight years later. So I'd submit that that theory, that conspiracy theory has gone out the window.

Now, it's clear that Dr. Porter disagreed with the decision to close the REI division. No doubt about that, and a lot of other people disagreed with it. But this was a business decision that was made by Dartmouth Health and specifically a business decision made by the chief clinical officer, Dr. Ed Merrens.

You'll hear the judge explain the business judgment rule during his charge to you.

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You may not agree with the decision. It may not be popular. It may not be something that you want to happen or others wanted to happen or the media said shouldn't have happened, but Dartmouth Health had the responsibility and certainly within their province to decide whether or not it made sense to keep the REI division open any longer.

And just because a business decision may be unpopular and result in difficult decisions that impact the employment of the individuals does not make it discriminatory or retaliatory.

Remember what this case is about. It's a disability discrimination and whistleblower retaliation case. And you may have thought at some point when you were listening to the evidence, like what are we listening to?

Because there were a number of witnesses where it was really unclear to me whether or not we were actually talking about an employment discrimination and retaliation case.

Upfront I gave you a little bit of a preview of the evidence to say, well, here's what happened. I suspect at this point you can see how we got here.

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Now, through a series of e-mails that were sent, shown to you a couple of times in the closing, the same e-mails, plaintiff attempts to cast doubt on the legitimate basis for the REI division closure, and I submit that they fall flat.

Let's go over the issue of the REI division closure itself and the reasons for it.

There's been a lot of testimony about the reasons for the REI division closure.

Plaintiff's counsel tried to demonstrate that Dr. Merrens or others like Dr. Conroy were not credible because they did not articulate each and every reason for the closure when they spoke to the employees or the media.

You heard from Dr. Conroy. She had a five-minute conversation with Dr. Merrens. This happened before she even got there as the CEO, and that goes to the heart, the credibility of this case and the lack of evidence to support the claims. She didn't have anything to add in that regard.

Ms. Nunan brought up declining birthrates, declining birthrates. She talked about the lack of providers in that interview.

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She didn't know anything about the REI division closure other than what Dr. Merrens told her.

Plaintiff's counsel also wondered why their public comments made no mention of infighting among the physicians, dysfunction in the REI division, interpersonal conflicts. Why didn't we say that to the public and to the media?

Does that really -- just step back and listen to that line of reasoning. Does that really make sense to you?

Would you have really expected

Dr. Merrens to put a spotlight on all of the underlying reasons for the closure when he spoke to employees outside of the REI division? Or when he spoke to the media?

His messaging to staff was meant to provide some details, not all the reasons why. It was high level. It would have been unprofessional and, quite frankly, caused even more reputational harm if he went into detail about the fact that all three of these physicians couldn't get along in the sandbox together. They couldn't get along and collaborate and engage in teamwork.

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And, by the way, this isn't just
Dr. Porter. It's all three of them, right? I
referred to the land of misfit toys upfront
because that's just what I think of when I think
of this group of individuals who all bear
responsibility for the dysfunction in the REI
division. It's not one person. We're not in
any way saying, well, this is all Dr. Porter.
No. All three of them share some level of
responsibility and culpability for why the REI
division wasn't working.

And, to be sure, e-mails don't tell the full story, especially ones that are -- that are sent postmortem after the fact of the closure had happened.

And Dr. Merrens testified. He was asked pointblank. I was embarrassed. I was embarrassed that this happened; that this division couldn't get its act together for a variety of different reasons, but the dysfunction was the root cause for the real problem, which was an inability to recruit and retain highly specialized nurses.

As he testified, they were inextricably linked. And I think Ms. Nunan asked you about

Exhibit 60, if we can pull that up.

Thanks, Ray.

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As Ms. Nunan noted, it's ultimately the dysfunction of the physicians who worked in this area for years, as well as recent hires, and ultimately a failure of leadership, for which I hold Leslie fully accountable.

Certainly Dr. DeMars has some culpability here for her failure of leadership. No doubt. No doubt. And part of the problem is having two friends where one is now the supervisor of the chair of the OB/GYN department. That made it awkward. A natural awkwardness is probably an understatement. And because of the fact that there was this dysfunction, they did not have sufficient nursing assistance.

Ms. Nunan was trying to call into question Dr. Merrens and, well, why didn't he share something with the public and why didn't we say something to the public or to the media? He was under no duty to do that. And the fact that he didn't do that doesn't call into question the legitimacy of his decision-making or, for that matter, raise a question of his overall credibility.

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The same holds true in terms of where Dr. Porter's counsel tried to call into question the basis for Dr. Porter's termination.

Dr. Merrens was crystal clear on this point.

The REI division closure resulted in the termination of all three positions, no question, including Dr. Porter.

And plaintiff's counsel had one witness who testified that in a big audience of members of the OB/GYN department, she asked about Misty's termination. Dr. Merrens said she was, quote, on disability, end quote. Now, does that really make sense?

Now, that's Dr. Russell who said, well, I then saw her fairly shortly thereafter, and I think I referred to it as the raspberry patch.

She never makes any mention of this alleged comment by Dr. Merrens.

And Dr. Merrens could not be any more clear. He never discussed anyone's status and certainly nothing specific about Dr. Porter. He's the chief clinical officer of a hospital and had been for a number of years. He wasn't a rookie at this. He understood how to make presentations to staff and what he would and

would not say. And he was clear; he never said that.

And, in fact, Dr. Porter's suggestion that this experienced, high-level executive would go before a room of 30 or 40 people and announce that Dr. Porter had been terminated because of her disability is just plain illogical. It doesn't -- it doesn't make sense.

And, in fact, while you had one person say that with respect to -- on behalf of Dr. Porter, you had Kelly Mousley, who doesn't work for Dartmouth Health. And by the way, I think six out of ten Dartmouth Health's witnesses don't work for Dartmouth Health anymore, one of whom, Ms. Gunnell, had been laid off.

So when you look at credibility, I really want you to look at the credibility of the witnesses. I mean, she certainly didn't want to be here. She got laid off a couple years ago.

Does anybody really think they want to be testifying in a court case if they had been laid off by that same employer? But she was credible. She was believable.

Let's go back to that issue of the big

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OB/GYN department meeting. Katie Mansfield who attended the meeting, Ms. Nunan said, well, they didn't recall it. What did Katie Mansfield actually say? She testified that Dr. Merrens did not say that, and she would have recalled something like that. Quote, And she would have recalled something like that, end quote.

Kelly Mousley, another former Dartmouth
Health manager, testified in no uncertain terms
that Dr. Merrens said nothing about Misty
Porter's condition or anything about her
personally. In her words, quote, I feel like
that's something I would remember. Yeah, that's
big, end quote. That was her testimony. This
just didn't happen.

Let me give you a few comments just about the state of the REI division because plaintiff's entire case rests on this conspiracy theory. They concocted this idea that we're just going to get rid of a division, get rid of all three positions. Ms. Nunan said, yep, the baby out with the bath water. All because of Dr. Porter. The evidence doesn't support it. The facts don't support it. The testimony doesn't support it.

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Let's go back to what the REI division was and was not. It's undisputed that this was a small rural program. It didn't have a high volume of patients. It had a good amount of turnover of physicians and nurses between 2005 and 2015. And as I predicted in the opening statement, current and former Dartmouth Health employees testified that the REI division was a tough environment to work in. And REI's reputation far and away preceded it.

I think we all know, and have in our own respective businesses where we may work, examples of, well, that department is pretty tough. I don't want to really deal with them. That's exactly what the case was with the REI division.

In the early years of the REI division there were two factions. There was the Misty Porter team. There was Sharon Parent, her nurse, and then the other team.

And later on it became three different camps and three different silos, right? And it was clear and certainly clear from the evidence that Dr. Hsu and Dr. Seifer didn't help to bridge the gap in teamwork and collaboration

along with Dr. Porter.

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You may recall that Sharon Parent was the first witness to testify in support of Dr. Porter. You might also recall that Ms. Parent's testimony about the recruitment of nurses to the REI division was proven to be totally false. She testified — this is Ms. Parent. She was the first witness, which I realize, I'm not sure if it was true for all of you, that seems like that was months ago. She testified no one ever asked her for ideas on how to recite nurses, and Dartmouth Health never posted the position externally.

But then she was presented by

Ms. McDonald with evidence of the contrary;

that, in fact, there was an e-mail showing that

they had been looking for ways, Dr. Seifer had

been looking for ways to recruit nurses to the

REI division. And this predated the

November/December time period. There's postings

that were sent out in June of 2016.

In fact, I'd ask you to look at Exhibit V, if you'd bring that up, Ray.

This was the posting that went out in June of 2016. They had been looking for REI

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division nurses for a really long time. And Ms. Parent said, Well, it should take you about six months to find somebody. They didn't. They couldn't find anybody. That's the reality.

Now, in terms of the atmosphere within the REI division, the environment, they had a number of people come up before you. Again, Dr. Judy Stern, the retired director of embryology, and I think you all agree she was an honest broker, unvarnished and heartfelt, and right out of the gate without any prompting said Dr. Porter is not a team player. She worked with her for 10 to 15 years.

A couple of times I'm not sure who was asking the questions, me or Dr. Stern, because she wanted to explain the environment that they -- everybody was operating in. She testified she worked with Misty Porter for many years, and her comments were credible.

She stated, quote, I just wanted to say that Dr. Porter had criticisms of all the physicians in the division, end quote. And that that was her experience throughout the time she was there.

She said that Dr. Porter had a lot of

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criticisms about the nursing staff, often about some of her lab staff, and they didn't do things the way she thought they should be done. And, yes, she gave one example about an internal form that the chair of the department wanted to use. And that may seem like meaningless to some people, but it's just par for the course on how the dynamic in this group was. It was untenable. There was a lot of tension. And that happened before Dr. Hsu came on the team, it was before Dr. Seifer came on the team, and before Dr. Porter had her disability or her condition, her medical condition.

What about Kelly Mousley? Another former D-H employee who was asked to testify. She was direct. She was forthright. She was clear. The nurses didn't get along. She talked about the fact that she supervised the administrative staff across all six OB/GYN divisions and testified about the REI division. There were periods of time, in her words that, quote, I felt like it was my full-time job, end quote.

You also heard that from Ms. Gunnell, right? Corroboration of testimony.

Corroboration of the fact that to the extent

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that there were individuals that had responsibility for the REI division as well as other divisions within the OB/GYN department, they spent the lion's share of their time on dealing with conflict, disagreements, disputes in the REI division.

I asked Kelly Mousley if she experienced this level of struggle or lack of professionalism in other divisions. No. Quote, no, nothing like this. It was an outlier, end quote.

People warned Ms. Mousley of Dr. Porter.

She said, quote, People telling me that if I met with Dr. Porter to stand my ground and not allow her to intimidate or bully me, to do what's right. Quote, Try to warn me to be prepared and to be strong.

Now, remember, she doesn't work for
Dartmouth Health. She came in to testify about
her experiences in that division. There was no
coordination between teams on how to handle
incoming patient calls. And you heard a lot
about that, this territorialness. Well, if a
patient came in and it wasn't for that
particular provider, it didn't get over to the

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other provider. I mean, hopefully the evidence as you saw it demonstrated that this group had no teamwork, no collaboration whatsoever. There was lots of dissension.

And then other than her few supporters, her team, if you will, Dr. Porter was critical of a slew of physicians and nurses, many of them junior and less experienced. You heard the testimony about the fact that Dr. Porter criticized some of the other former physicians; a woman by the name of Sophia as well as her husband, Neil. You saw many, many e-mail communications from Dr. Porter herself where she is, at a minimum, critical and, at worse, downright mean-spirited.

Now, let me just turn to the two physicians who were subjected to, if you will, character assassinations throughout this trial. I told you that Dr. Porter didn't call them as witnesses, and I think that's telling.

With respect to Albert Hsu, where do we begin with him? Dr. Porter had a negative view of Dr. Hsu before he even got there.

Dr. Porter, whether she was his formal mentor or not, seemed to give up on Dr. Hsu after his

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first six months. She testified, the first six months I was there for call, et cetera, and then let him go on his own to be independent and then, well, he didn't do things according to the way that she thought they should be done.

What should she have done? She's there as the more senior person in the division. So even though she had been out for six months on her leave of absence, December of '15 through June of '16, in June she writes this long letter basically gaslighting Dr. Hsu for all the shortfalls of his practice; clinical skills, competency, et cetera.

And when David Seifer came on the scene right in that same time period, he gets this long list of basically trashing Dr. Hsu.

Now, Dr. Seifer got the job that
Dr. Porter always coveted but was never
considered for, and there had to be just a tinge
of jealousy masked by some of her numerous
critical comments.

She immediately found everything wrong with his clinical knowledge, his skills, his technique. Of course, Dr. Seifer joined a small REI program where the lines had been drawn well

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before he got there. No one was as great as Dr. Porter in her mind. Dr. Seifer's brief 11-month tenure was probably doomed from the start.

Now, Dr. Seifer had his own problems with proper social graces and communication skills, I'm not minimizing those issues, but needless to say the lack of collaboration and teamwork created a negative environment which really expedited the eventual demise and closure of the REI division just a few months into 2017.

And what about the REI division? What about the reasons why they closed it? Now, there's not just one reason, and that's understandable, right? You're -- there's not one reason why something happens that's a really complex critical decision that's going to affect a number of people.

The final six months Dr. Porter calls into question, well, there wasn't really a nursing shortage. There wasn't really a problem. There are ways to fix the nursing shortage. They should have been able to do it, but time and again the testimony across the board was consistent and it was corroborated by

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multiple e-mail communications and documents.

And despite claiming it was somehow artificially manufactured, even Dr. Porter had to reluctantly acknowledge it. Remember, by late 2016 the REI division was down two people. Casey Dodge had been terminated or resigned. Sharon Parent retired in December of 2016.

And Dr. Porter's counsel repeatedly suggested that had Sharon Parent been allowed to return from retirement, the nursing shortage would have been solved. You saw documents and heard evidence establishing that that simply was not true. The REI division was looking for additional nursing support at that time above and beyond Ms. Parent, and when she did retire the shortage only became more dire.

And Heather Gunnell testified; remember she was the individual who had been laid off by Dartmouth Health. She was asked whether Sharon could have solved the nursing crisis, and her testimony was clear. Absolutely not. That was not — that was a small Band-Aid on a major, major problem. And by April of 2017 it's undisputed that they were left to one less-than-fully-trained REI nurse.

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Exhibit J, if we could pull that up, that was an exchange between Dr. Porter and Karen George. You heard testimony from Karen George. They both acknowledged that they -- quote, Nursing situation on all fronts is a nightmare. Nursing needs to change.

Now, you then saw, if we can bring up
A-16, and I'll run through this fairly quickly
because the evidence of this was overwhelming.
December 6th there's a message from Dr. DeMars
and Dr. Seifer about the imminent REI nursing
crunch and requiring significant changes in
nursing workflow and task allocation. And that
they had to focus their efforts on providing
excellent patient care for those who already had
a tentative start date, and they were pushing
off the start dates for other people. This is
December, right? Early December. Mid-December.

A-20, if we could.

December 16th. This is the e-mail from Dr. Seifer, just ten days later. During the months of January and February we will not see any new patients, and we will be limiting our patient appointments to only those necessary for the patients currently in cycle who will need

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retrievals or transfers from January or February.

Once again, Dr. Porter's whole case rests on this was a conspiracy to get her out. They created this entire rouse. So all of these documents, the 90 documents you saw, were all a rouse and conspiracy to get Dr. Porter out of Dartmouth Health.

But then you have not just those events where they're really slowing down or pausing new patient referrals, right? Because they don't have capacity to handle it. You then have the January/February, 2017 Value Institute. And in that there are a couple things that happened. There's a couple of meetings in December, or I should say the fall of 2016 and then January and February of 2017, and they have a couple of retreat dates.

And Dr. DeMars testified that the evaluation by the Value Institute was twofold.

One was that the division was unsalvageable.

And, two, that if she was going to keep

Dr. Porter on in the department that she had to do two things. First was to very clearly confront her that she was central to the

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dysfunction and that, if she were to continue, that it could not be in a leadership role.

And Dr. DeMars testified, quote, I remember looking at the person who talked to me about this and saying, This would have been the hardest thing I would ever have to do, end quote.

Heather Gunnell and Daniel Herrick both testified that this was not salvageable; that this -- that the report out of the Value Institute was that we couldn't do anything about it. It was not -- we couldn't fix it at the end of the day.

Go to B-2 for a second. Then you have Dr. Porter's comments about the program itself, and those comments are particularly telling. She said, Indeed, the program is close to dissolution.

Further on down she says, There's not enough IVF at DHMC, nor has there ever been, despite heavy efforts at marketing and outreach for many providers within REI to focus only on IVF. Again, these are her words.

And by April the writing was on the wall, if we could bring up B-7.

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This is April 27. This is the e-mail from Ms. Gunnell to Dr. Porter regarding patient scheduling. Actually it's to everybody, and it was sent on behalf of Dr. DeMars. We have a critical staffing issue in REI, and once again they're deferring new infertility evaluations. They're not scheduling any patients for an ART cycle. And the remaining patients, May through July, are currently under review. Updates will be forthcoming.

And this was just the final straw.

Because by that date Marlene Grossman, who was the one REI, full-time REI nurse in Bedford;

Bedford/Manchester, New Hampshire, she resigned, and so now you're left with one less-than-fully-trained nurse.

I want to turn your attention to the claims in this case, right? I said upfront the claims in this case are employee discrimination and retaliation.

Based upon the evidence in the record

Dr. Merrens was the ultimate decisionmaker on

the REI closure. He didn't know anything about

Dr. Porter's medical status or condition at that

point. He didn't know anything about any

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complaints she made about Dr. Hsu or Dr. Seifer. And so when you're looking at the analysis, the legal analysis that you're being asked to perform, remember those facts. Because that's factually what the record reveals.

And despite trying to rattle him by calling them in their case, Dr. Merrens was emphatic. I received recommendations from Daniel Herrick -- who by the way is no longer employed by Dartmouth Health -- to close the REI division.

Leslie DeMars, while plaintiff's counsel also called her in their case-in-chief, which they have a right to do. They tried to challenge her on various points on cross-examination right out of the gate. She was unflappable. She told you what happened and where she was in the recommendation process.

She recommended the closure of IVF but not the REI division. She was clear about that. And she also said that she disagreed with the decision to close the division. Quote, I disagree with it. I was unable to argue my disagreement, and I was unable to turn back the fact that the actions had been taken, the

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termination actions had been taken and it had been publicized, end quote.

Quote, I was not allowed to present that plan before the decision was made to terminate the division, end quote.

And with regard to Dr. Porter, Dr. DeMars testified, I absolutely wanted her to stay on.

I had a job for her that I was trying to plan for. You saw that Exhibit 50-A, if we could pull that up for a second.

Because this gets down to your analysis of what was available for her, what position could she potentially go to. And there was testimony by Heather Gunnell who testified that she and Daniel drafted this theoretical plan to retain Dr. Porter at the request of Dr. DeMars.

But the record is clear on a couple points. One, this document never went to Dr. Merrens, so he didn't consider it in his decision. And, two, Dr. Chertoff will testify -- testified, and remember she's the doctor that travelled from Portland, Oregon by planes, trains and automobiles to get here, albeit a day later. She testified that they already had gynecological ultrasound experts in

the radiology department.

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And it would be -- when it became clear that Dr. Merrens was unwilling to keep the REI division open, Dr. DeMars called a colleague at UVM to get her a job. You saw those text messages asking her to help her friend. Yeah, you should call our friend. There's no unlawful animus here. There's no discriminatory motive at play here. Just a conflicted individual who's struggling to do right by her friend while also doing the right thing for the OB/GYN department.

But at the end of the day, at the end of the day she didn't make the decision. She just didn't make the decision. That was Dr. Merrens.

You saw him testify. He testified on two days, not one. And the evidence throughout this case sustained that Dr. DeMars's friendship with Misty was a complicated one and one that created numerous challenges for her leadership.

Dr. DeMars was fully aware of the issues Dr. Porter created within the REI division, and she kind of put up with it for a long period of time. And it even went so far as to approach human resources to ask him to prepare a

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memorandum of expectation about Dr. Porter's behavior. You remember seeing that. She said, Well, it's the biggest mistake of my life. I really should have held her accountable, but she couldn't. She was her friend. She actually helped Dr. DeMars get pregnant with her second son. Like how conflicted can you be? Never mind a friendship and the fact that they shared rooms together. Dr. Porter helped Dr. DeMars get pregnant with her second son. That's undisputed.

And if anybody doesn't think that that created a level of conflict, awkwardness to deal with her friend and colleague who was difficult to deal with from a teamwork and collaboration standpoint, I don't know what is.

She didn't deliver the memo to Dr. Porter and testified that was her biggest mistake. And Dr. Merrens didn't rely on any recommendation by Dr. DeMars with respect to the REI closure. In fact, he testified he, quote, completely lost faith in her as a leader.

So you're being asked before, well, you know, Dr. DeMars harbored this animus towards
Dr. Porter and that should be imputed to

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Dr. Merrens and, therefore, Dartmouth Health should be held responsible. How can that be? Dr. Merrens was really clear.

At this point Dr. DeMars, her judgment and inability to actually run the OB/GYN department was clear. She couldn't do it. And he saw that, and he certainly wasn't listening to her. In fact, she testified, hey, I think we should shut down the IVF department but not the REI division. She was clear about that.

And he made the decision, I'm shutting down the entire thing. And he did that even though it was unpopular, but it needed to be done for a lot of reasons.

Now, what about the potential accommodations that Dr. Porter thinks she should have received at the time of the REI closure?

I'm not going to go into all of the law here because you're going to hear that from Judge Doyle. But under the ADA, the Rehab Act, the disability discrimination laws, if somebody has a disability, you might have -- you've got a duty to reasonably accommodate them. And "reasonably accommodate" includes reassignment to a vacant position. That's what the law

states. Reassignment to a vacant position. Those words are really important for you to understand.

There are a number of other things that could be a reasonable accommodation, but here this is a big issue, right? You receive a charge from the Court that the ADA does not require creating a new position with somebody, even somebody with a disability.

Now, I don't want to -- even though there was not a significant amount of testimony on this topic, it goes to intent, motive, et cetera, I want you to remember what Dartmouth Health did to reasonably accommodate Dr. Porter from December 15 to the closure of the REI division in May of 2017. That's about 18 months. She was on two leaves of absence for nine months total.

And when she was there it was a fairly sporadic, reduced schedule while she was on long-term disability, which started in June of 2016.

If we can show Exhibit 129, Ray, I'd appreciate that.

This just highlights the laundry list of

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accommodations that she sought and Dr. DeMars approved and authorized for her. Dr. Porter does not dispute that Dr. DeMars approved and authorized all of the requested accommodations in June of '16; allowed her to work from home, allowed her to have space at work by herself. She had essentially created her own schedule. You heard testimony about the fact that she didn't want anybody else knowing her schedule.

While she blames the termination of her emotional well-being over the summer of 2017, she acknowledged that after the REI division had been closed she had two separate visits to the Mayo Clinic for two-week periods. So two two-week periods; June/July, July/August. And then she had another surgery in September of 2017 and was on another leave of abscess, albeit at UVM, from September to November of '17.

Now, I went back to the opening statement in this case, and Mr. Vitt referred to the fact that Dr. Porter did surgeries that no one could perform. He said it a couple times. What's the actual evidence in this case?

There was no vacant position in the radiology department. Leslie DeMars testified

that she went to the chair of the radiology department, at the time Joselyn Chertoff, to inquire about any potential vacancies for her friend, Misty Porter. And she went to the radiology department and asked her, and then you heard not just from Leslie DeMars, you heard it from Dr. Chertoff. And she testified in May of 2017 there were no open positions in our radiology department. They already had a sufficient number of radiologists, and there's no evidence in the record to suggest otherwise.

Remember, it's the plaintiff's burden here. Plaintiff has to show that there was a vacant position available to be reassigned to. It was glossed over in Ms. Nunan's initial statement, but it's important for you to remember because that's the law.

If somebody has a disability and the employer has a reasonable duty to accommodate in this particular place, Dr. Porter is asserting that, well, I should have been reassigned. I should have been reassigned to OB/GYN. I should have been reassigned to radiology. I'll get to OB/GYN in a second.

Let's just stay with radiology for a

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second because there's two different places that she could have ended up. Dr. Chertoff was clear and articulate that she, as well as many other physicians in the radiology department, interpreted gynecologic and early obstetric ultrasounds on a routine and regular basis. So Dr. Porter's skills were not unique, special, or missing after she left Dartmouth Health.

And the testimony by friends, many of Dr. Porter's friend that testified were all in other divisions or other subdivisions of Dartmouth Health. That doesn't change the fact that Dr. Porter was not a unicorn.

And to be sure, you heard Dr. Chertoff, right? She testified she's interpreted over 10,000 gynecologic and early obstetric ultrasounds. That's undisputed. That's unrebutted testimony. There's nothing to contradict that.

But Dr. Chertoff was already clear that, you know, I wasn't the only one, but as the chair she certainly had that expertise. And they routinely handled gynecologic and early obstetric ultrasounds on a daily, weekly, monthly basis. They have six ultrasound rooms

there.

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Now, what about possible reassignment to the OB/GYN department? Dr. Porter testified that three weeks after the REI division closure she wrote a letter to Dr. Merrens, Dr. Padin and others. Exhibit B-12. That's the May 25, 2017 letter, okay? This is a key document.

There's a lot of important documents in this case, but I would submit that this is a key document. And it's interesting, out of the seven exhibits that we heard in the initial closing statements, this was not one of them.

This is a key document for you to review because why?

Dr. Porter send it three weeks after she received notification in person that the REI division was being shut down. She obviously took a long time to write the letter. It's important for what is in it and what is not in it. Please review it when you can.

She doesn't mention anything about being treated differently by Dartmouth Health as a result of her condition or any complaints about anything; patient harm, patient safety, anything about Dr. Hsu or Seifer.

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If anything, all she does is try to show, well, you know, compared to the other two doctors I'm much more superior, and you should keep me in some capacity.

Now, as you heard, she had the same legal counsel in this case, Mr. Vitt, as she did back in 2013, and she had every opportunity in this letter, three weeks after, to raise any issues in this letter on the claims that are now in her lawsuit. She didn't raise them in the letter, and she didn't raise them in her meeting with the head of human resources. Think about it.

We can go back to C-13 for a second, and then I'll come back. We'll go to the second page.

This is a letter where she meets with the head of HR, the head of HR for the entire

Dartmouth Health system. This is in response to your letter dated May 25 and to the questions she posed during this meeting on May 26th, right?

Okay, now, go back to the B-12 for -- if you would.

In the document she says, quote, As a gynecologic surgeon I perform complex

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hysteroscopic -- this is definitely challenging -- laparoscopic and robotic procedures not offered by many, if not most of the other gynecologists, end quote. That was Dr. Porter's words.

Now, what can you glean from those words? Well, one, she's actually admitting that other people at Dartmouth Health actually do these things, right? Other people. Not many, if not most, but that leads you to think, well, there's a couple people that do that.

And Dr. -- we'll get to Dr. Padin in a second. And you heard from her, right?

Dr. Padin, she testified not once but twice.

And during her first round of testimony

Dr. Padin could not be more clear.

In 2017, June/July, 2017 the hospital needed a generalist to assist in labor and delivery. And despite Dr. Porter's dual appointment in OB/GYN and radiology, she didn't have current credentials or privileges in obstetrics. There is no dispute about that. This is not a factual dispute. Dr. Porter did not have privileges in obstetrics, period, full stop.

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When Dr. -- and it's clear from the record that because she didn't have those privileges, she was not qualified to be reassigned to that position in the OB/GYN department in the summer of 2017.

And during her second stint of testimony Dr. Padin, this past Friday, which also seems like a long time ago, Dr. Padin says she performed many procedures under the umbrella of the reproductive endocrinology, advanced laparoscopies -- I'm definitely saying that wrong -- myomectomies, robotic surgeries.

Right? She said all these things. She performed these surgeries.

And, remember, Dr. Padin is the one that proctored that surgery back in April for Dr. Porter, and she proctored it because she has those privileges. She does those surgeries.

There was no vacant, open, existing open position for Dr. Porter at that point. And under the law we submit, under the ADA Rehab Act, the state disability discrimination laws, there was no open vacant position for her to be reassigned to as a potential reasonable accommodation.

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Let me turn to whistleblower retaliation and why Dr. Porter cannot establish pretext, and you heard a little bit about that from Ms. Nunan.

Dr. Merrens had no knowledge of
Dr. Porter's long trail of complaints about the
other REI positions, meaning Dr. Hsu and Seifer,
which dated back many years.

And, by the way, when we look at retaliation, think about that issue for a second. Well, her complaints about Dr. Hsu started in 2013, and somehow, even though she had complaints in 2013, '14, '15, '16, '17 about Dr. Hsu, somehow those complaints are the reason why she was terminated in May of '17. It doesn't ring true. It just doesn't.

Again, the evidence in the record, the exhibits before you, the witness testimony, which is corroborated, all of the points that I've presented to you.

She can't be considered a whistleblower because here Dr. Merrens had no knowledge of Dr. Porter's history of complaints. His decision to close the REI division was his decision alone, and Dr. Porter didn't make any

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comments to Dr. Merrens. And think about that, right?

Back in 2012, 2013, she's got this dispute with the OB/GYN chair. She has Dr. Merrens there as kind of a neutral. She says very glowing things about him in Exhibits B, C and D, which are admitted into evidence, and then she doesn't go back to him when she's having any problems with anyone else in the REI division.

While she -- the record is clear. While she had relied upon his counsel and guidance on other earlier occasions, she had not spoken to him in a couple years. She certainly knew that she could reach out to him. She didn't do it.

Now, what about the other people involved?

Daniel Herrick, he says he didn't have any knowledge of complaints or concerns about Dr. Porter on anything. Heather Gunnell, ditto.

Now, Leslie DeMars certainly had been in communication with Dr. Porter about her range of grievances with Dr. Hsu and Seifer, but she was -- the record is clear in this case that she didn't tell Merrens, Herrick, or Gunnell about

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Dr. Porter's complaints regarding Dr. Hsu and Seifer.

Let me just say that one more time because it's important. She didn't tell Merrens, Herrick, or Gunnell about Dr. Porter's specific complaints regarding Hsu and Seifer.

And that brings you then to the reason why there's no causal connection, right?

There's an issue of engaging in protected activity. There's an adverse employment action. But the third prong of that, of a prima facia case for retaliation is a causal connection between the two things. There has to be a causal connection.

Dr. Porter's complaints about other physicians and nurses dates back at least ten years, and you heard from Dr. Stern, Kelly Mousley, Katie Mansfield, so it's not surprising that Dr. Porter had complaints about her newer colleagues.

And from shortly after Dr. Hsu started until the time of her termination, Dr. Porter reported concerns to Dr. DeMars. We're not saying that she didn't do that. We're not saying that. We're just saying that those

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complaints, whatever they are, had nothing to do with her termination of her employment when they closed the REI division.

Because, remember, to the extent that Dr. Porter raised complaints in 2014, in 2015, in 2016 about Dr. Hsu, nothing negative happened to Dr. Porter during any of those periods of time.

You also heard testimony, and this is important for purposes of understanding the evidence and whether or not Dr. Porter meets her burden of proof. There were similar complaints by others in the REI division; Beth Todd, numerous complaints about Dr. Hsu and Seifer.

And while Dr. Porter complains she was retaliated against for making those identical complaints and for failing to be reassigned to an unknown, unspecific position, Beth Todd is still gainfully employed at Dartmouth Health today.

And you saw in Exhibit C-13, the last page talked about the fact that Beth Todd actually had a dual appointment and actually did a lot of work in OB/GYN, and she's the one person, the nurse practitioner who remained

employed at Dartmouth Health.

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Finally -- and I appreciate everybody's patience in listening and attentiveness -- let me get to the subject of damages.

We didn't put an expert on the stand because we don't think you should even get to the subject of damages at all, but let me make a few comments about it.

You heard from Dr. Bancroft, Dr. Porter's quote, unquote, hired gun. You have to make a decision on whether or not he was credible after multiple iterations of multiple reports and multiple conclusions about multiple numbers.

Yes, it's true, lawyers aren't great at math, but I'm not sure that this guy is either. And some of the members of the jury would remember an SNL character by Jon Lovitz who always said, Yeah, that's the ticket, and that's exactly who Dr. Bancroft is. Anything that Dr. Porter said or Dr. Porter's counsel said to him, he created new assumptions, he created new facts, and that's how he came up with his numbers.

You remember he said, Well, actually I didn't even have the documents initially. I

threw them away. But then he said my house burned down, and then he wasn't sure where they were. But on cross-examination he admitted that he hadn't been told some critical information.

Now, what is in the record is the fact that his opinions vary dramatically over the years. At one point he said it was 4.3 million dollars, and then it dropped all the way down to 1.7 million dollars but it was still a grossly inflated number.

And then you get to the retirement age.

In his earlier reports he said, well, you should look at 65 years old as the date she would retire. But when he had to actually reduce all of these assumptions for her potential damages all the way through 2033, he now says, magically, well, you got to assume that she was going to work until she was 70.

But it didn't stop there in terms of his manipulation of the assumptions. All of this is speculation and in an obvious attempt to juice up the numbers because he's moving the -- it's a sliding scale, and all of his reports are all over the place based on different assumptions.

And only this latest analysis, which he

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did five days before trial where he had to now acknowledge that Dr. Porter was a full-time professor, doesn't really come through.

He now had -- he also tries to make an assumption. Well, she was going to reduce her schedule from 1.0 to .75 in July of this coming year. But when Mr. Coffin actually asked him to do the analysis, to do an apples-to-apples comparison, like, okay, if you're making assumptions that she was going to be 1.0 FTE, full-time equivalent at Dartmouth Health, you should at least do the same when she was working at UVM.

If he did the math, and he asked him to do it, and whether he disagreed with him or not, there was no basis for economic damages because by 2025 and further on she was actually earning more at UVM. There's no basis for economic damages. There's no basis for emotional distress. There's no basis for punitive damages, which is even an higher standard that Dr. Porter can't meet.

Because, remember, this comes back to credibility of witnesses and corroboration of evidence.

BENTLEY COURT REPORTING

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There are 90 exhibits and 20 witnesses. All of you listened to the evidence intently, took notes throughout the trial. Everybody appreciates that.

My final thoughts. Dartmouth Health's closure of the REI division in 2017 was done after thoughtful deliberation relating to its continuing viability. Dr. Merrens, Dr. Padin, Daniel Herrick, Heath Gunnell all testified it was the right call.

Dr. Merrens was here with you throughout the entire trial. You've got to judge his credibility, too, right? His testimony was unwaivering. He was emphatic. He made the decision to shut down the REI division altogether. He had no knowledge, no knowledge of Dr. Porter's disability, no knowledge of her complaints regarding Dr. Hsu and Seifer. Yet, he's the one that made the decision, and that's where legally Dr. Porter's claims fall apart.

He made the decision to shut down the REI division because it was a dumpster fire, for lack of a better term. It was never about Dr. Porter. It was about an unsalvageable program. That's what the Value Institute said.

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And plaintiff's theory of the case consists of the following. Dartmouth Health concocted a plan to terminate her by closing an entire division, something it had never done before.

Ask yourself, would Dartmouth Health really have shut down a whole division, something it's never done before, just to get rid of one employee, especially a talented surgeon like Dr. Porter?

And I want you to look at the record.

Look at the testimony and the exhibits against the credibility of the witnesses who came before you.

Respectfully we request that you render a verdict on behalf of Dartmouth Health in this case on all of Dr. Porter's claims.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. Any rebuttal from the plaintiff?

REBUTTAL CLOSING ARGUMENT ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF:

MS. NUNAN: Attorney Schroeder stated that Dr. Porter had shamelessly exploited Patient Eunice Lee.

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I specifically asked Eunice Lee why she had chosen to come forward and tell her very personal and painful story about her experience at Dartmouth Health. She was harmed by Dr. Hsu. Her response was, I'm one of many women, and I do not want to be a faceless name on a billing statement.

Her testimony came in the face of
Dr. Merrens' statement at this trial: I am not
aware of any actual harm. D-H does not want to
talk about patient harm. It does not want you
to consider patient harm, and this is why
Dr. Porter spoke up. She could not tolerate it.
She would not be quiet about it, and she could
not watch these two doctors operate
incompetently.

If Dr. Porter had accepted the severance package that Dr. -- that Attorney Schroeder keeps pointing out, all of this would have been swept under the rug. She wouldn't have been able to talk about it.

Attorney Schroeder labeled the women who came forward; Sharon Parent, Julia MacCallum, Vicky Maxfield, Janice Gonyea, and Dr. Karen George as Dr. Porter's friends. This is

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insulting. These are women who have decades of professional experience as nurses and doctors who take their duty to report seriously, their duty to come and speak in public about these issues seriously. They are not Dr. Porter's friends first. They're professionals first.

Dr. Julia MacCallum testified that she reported what she saw in the OR at Dartmouth Health in 2015; Dr. Hsu's ripping and yanking in surgery. She reported that as a resident way before she became close with Dr. Porter.

Hospital transparency matters. It matters all the way to the top. What Dr. Merrens says, what Dr. Conroy says, the public has to trust what top administrators — that they're going to tell the truth.

What he says, what Dr. Merrens says to the staff and what he says to the media matters. The public has to trust that when they go to D-H to get services, women -- women like you, like your mom, your daughter, that the people who are there performing the procedures are qualified.

Dartmouth administrators had noticed in the summer of 2016 that they had two incompetent doctors on their hands. They allowed them to

124 perform procedures on women for another 1 2 12 months. This case is about patient harm and 3 Dr. Porter holding Dartmouth Hitchcock 4 5 accountable by speaking up loudly about it. THE COURT: Okay, so that concludes 6 7 closings arguments. The next part of the case I'll be 8 instructing you on the law. We're going to take 9 10 our lunch break before I do that, but I do want 11 to remind you, you do not have the case yet for 12 deliberation, so you should not be speaking with each other. You should not be researching the 1.3 case. You should not be talking to anyone about 14 the case. 15 I'll ask you to come back and be ready to 16 go at 12:45, at which time I will provide you 17 instructions. 18 19 Okay? Thank you. 20 THE CLERK: All rise for the jury. (The jury left the courtroom at 21 11:38 a.m.) 22 (Court officers were administered their 23 oath by the Clerk of Court.) 24

THE CLERK: All rise.

25

(Judge Doyle entered the courtroom.)

THE COURT: Issue to be taken up?

MR. SCHROEDER: Yes, your Honor.

Defendants want to move to strike the rebuttal statement for this specific reason; that what Ms. Nunan said quoting Eunice Lee was not actually what she said in the trial, as evidence in the record.

What Ms. Nunan said was, quote, attributing it to Ms. Lee, I'm one of many women, and I don't want to be a faceless name on a billing statement, end quote. That's not what she said.

In fact, she said, I can't be the only woman who is finding out about this way and the only woman who for years has been wondering did I do something wrong and was this my fault.

So, first of all, one, it wasn't said, and so attributing a quote to evidence in the record. All of our quotes were from the actual transcript, number one.

Number two, it wasn't said, and so there's the assumption that that was said, as if that's evidence.

Three, it implies that there's other --

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there's other patients or other women that had made any complaints about Dr. Hsu.

And, fourth, it contradicts actually what she testified to. She has no idea.

So I wasn't going to do it during her rebuttal because I think that's poor form, but we're moving to strike that statement from the rebuttal statement because it is not accurate. It's not what the evidence in this record is. It's highly prejudicial, and it leaves — it leaves sentiments of something that there is no evidence in the record to support.

THE COURT: Okay. Can you read again for me the statement that was made during rebuttal and the statement that you believe was made during the trial?

MR. SCHROEDER: Yes, your Honor, we checked with the court reporter.

The statement made during rebuttal was, and attributing to Eunice Lee, quote, I'm one of many women, and I don't want to be a faceless name on a billing statement, end quote.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHROEDER: That was never said in the trial of this case.

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What she did say in the transcript of the trial of this case is, I can't imagine what -- well, two things.

I can't be the only woman who is finding out about it this way and the only woman who for years has been wondering did I do something wrong or was this my fault, question mark, and not knowing what.

Further down in her answer, I can't imagine what other women are going through, and I kept thinking there has to be a face to this and a person who was assigned to this that — that this is what it has caused and the pain is still here and just as raw after ten years, end quote.

THE COURT: Okay.

Plaintiff?

MR. JONES: We're trying to pull up the transcript, but I believe it is a very fair summary of what was said.

There were two statements that Ms. Lee made in her testimony. One was referencing other women and that she was one of other women, and the other one was that she, when asked why she was doing this, there was a reference to not

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just being a faceless name on a billing statement. That was, I believe, in the testimony.

MR. SCHROEDER: Judge, we actually ordered the transcript.

MR. JONES: So did we.

MR. SCHROEDER: The whole transcript? You did?

MR. JONES: Parts.

MR. SCHROEDER: Parts. You didn't order that part.

Judge, I would ask the Court to just please review this issue. It's highly prejudicial. That testimony should -- we've already had our arguments on that issue of whether or not the testimony should have even happened, but this is now going one step beyond even that, and I respectfully ask the Court to please review it.

THE COURT: Okay. And are you asking for it to be stricken and not replaced by the actual testimony on that point? Just stricken?

MR. SCHROEDER: I ask that it be stricken completely. I don't think it should be replaced at all.

THE COURT: Okay. So I am going to want written copies of the two statements that you just mentioned. I didn't write it down. I was listening to you.

MR. SCHROEDER: That's okay. I'll be happy to get that.

Well, I'd have to ask the court reporter to print it out first, but we took it down verbatim.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything further from plaintiff in response to this about a potential remedy?

MS. NUNAN: Okay. And, but the third party, and maybe this -- like the most important part for me is I keep thinking, what about us? Like what about the patients? I can't be the only woman who is finding out about it this way and the only woman who for years has been wondering did I do something wrong, and was this my fault? And not knowing what, and just like anger and disappointment and sadness. I didn't want us to just be nameless patients out of like a billing statement.

THE COURT: That's the trial testimony?

MS. NUNAN: This is on Page 19 of the

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trial transcript of Eunice Lee.

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THE COURT: So please provide me with both statements. I'm going to take a look at it before we bring the jury back. Okay?

THE CLERK: All rise.

(Judge Doyle left the courtroom at 12:56 p.m.)

(The court reporter provided Judge Doyle, in chambers, the statement from Ms. Nunan's closing argument.)

(The following took place in open court without the jury present, at 1:08 p.m.)

THE COURT: Okay. So with respect to the request to strike the statement made during rebuttal, I have reviewed the trial testimony of Ms. Lee as well as the statement that was made in plaintiff's rebuttal.

So with respect to the trial testimony, this is a reference to Page 19, the relevant part, Lines 4 to 20. In the trial testimony Ms. Lee, again in relevant part, said, I can't be the only woman who is finding out about it this way and the only woman who, for years, has been wondering did I do something wrong and was this my fault. And not knowing that, and it

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just -- I have like anger and disappointment and sadness, and I didn't want us just to be these nameless patients out of like a billing statement. So that is the trial testimony.

The statement on rebuttal is, quote -- by Ms. Nunan attributing this to Ms. Lee -- I am one of many women, and I don't want to be a faceless name on a billing statement.

So I don't think -- well, first off, counsel is permitted to summarize testimony that came in at trial. It certainly can't be inaccurate, but I don't think in comparing these two statements that the message is frankly that inconsistent.

It's a reference to other women not being a faceless name on a billing statement, so I just don't think that rises to the level that I need to strike it. So I won't be striking that statement from the record.

Okay. Is there anything else to take up at this time, or can we bring the jury in?

MR. JONES: Not from us.

MR. SCHROEDER: Nothing, your Honor.

(The jury entered the courtroom at

1:11 p.m.)

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JURY CHARGE BY THE COURT:

THE COURT: Members of the jury, at this time I'm going to be providing you with my instructions that will guide your deliberations.

As you can see on your seats, you have also received a written copy. This is the jury instructions charge that I will be reading to you now so you can follow along. It is a 33-page document, so it may take a little while, but okay.

Now that you have heard the evidence and arguments, it is my duty to instruct you on the applicable law. My instructions come in two parts.

The first part consists of general instructions about the task of the jury and the rules and principals that should guide you in your deliberations. The second part consists of instructions that apply to the specific claims and defenses in this case. I ask that you pay equal attention to both parts.

It is your duty as jurors to follow the law and to apply it to the facts as you find them from the evidence presented in the courtroom. You are not to single out one

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instruction alone as stating the law but must consider the instructions as a whole.

You are not to be concerned with the wisdom of or reason behind any rule of law stated by the Court. Regardless of any opinion you may have as to what the law is or ought to be, it would be a violation of your sworn duty to base a verdict on any view of the law other than that given to you in these instructions.

It would also be a violation of your sworn duty as judges of the facts to base a verdict upon anything other than the evidence presented during the trial.

The lawyers have referred to some of the rules of law in their arguments. If any difference appears between the law as stated by the lawyers and the law as stated by the Court in these instructions, you must follow the Court's instructions.

Our judicial system requires that you carefully and impartially consider all of the evidence, follow the law, and reach a just verdict regardless of the consequences.

Jurors as finders of fact/rulings of the Court:

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You and you alone are the triers of the facts. Each of you as jurors must determine the facts for yourself in reaching a verdict. By the rulings that I made during the course of the trial I did not intend to express my own views about this case.

Sympathy/prejudice:

Neither sympathy nor prejudice for or against the parties or any other person involved with this case should influence you in any manner in reaching your verdict. Your deliberations should be well reasoned and impartial.

Evidence in the case:

The evidence in this case consists of the sworn testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits admitted into evidence and any stipulated facts, regardless of which party presented the evidence.

When the attorneys on both sides stipulate or agree to the existence of the fact, you must, unless other instructed, accept the stipulation and regard that fact as proved. You may give the stipulated fact, like any other evidence, the weight you think it deserves.

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Any evidence that has been stricken or excluded, as when an objection is sustained by the Court, must be disregarded, and you may not consider it in rendering your verdict.

Arguments, statements, objections of the attorneys:

The opening statements and closing arguments of the attorneys, their questions and objections and all other statements they made during the course of the trial are not evidence. The attorneys have a duty to object to evidence that they believe is not admissible. You should not draw any conclusions or make any judgment from the fact that an attorney has objected to the evidence.

The Court's ruling on objections:

From time to time the Court has been called on to determine the admissibility of certain evidence following the attorney's objections. You should not concern yourself with the Court's reason for any rulings on objections.

Whether offered evidence is admissible is purely a question of law for the Court and not a concern of the jury. In admitting evidence to

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which objections have been made, the Court does not determine what weight should be given to that evidence, nor does it assess the credibility of the evidence.

If the Court excludes evidence in response to an objection, attorney's objection, you will dismiss the evidence from your mind completely and entirely, and you will refrain from the speculation about the nature of any exchange regarding the evidence between the Court and the attorneys held out of your hearing.

Evidence, direct or circumstantial:

There are two types of evidence from which you may find the facts of this case; direct and circumstantial.

Direct evidence is the testimony of someone who asserts actual knowledge of a fact, such as an eyewitness.

Circumstantial evidence is prove of a chain of facts and circumstances tending to prove or disprove an issue in the case.

For example, if a witness were to testify that he or she had seen cows in a field, that would be an example of direct evidence that

there were cows in a field.

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On the other hand, if a witness were to testify that he or she had seen cow tracks in the field, that would be an example of circumstantial evidence that there had been cows in the field.

The law does not require a party to prove its claims or defenses by direct evidence alone. Rather, one or more of the essential elements of each of the claims or defenses may be established by a reasonable inference from other facts which are established by direct testimony.

And circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient proof. The law makes no distinction between the weight to be given to direct or circumstantial evidence, nor is a greater degree of certainty required with circumstantial evidence than of direct evidence. You should consider all the evidence in the case and give it as much or as little weight as you think it deserves.

Credibility of the witnesses:

You are the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to give their testimony is up to you. In

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considering the testimony of any witness, you may take into account his or her ability and opportunity to observe, his or her demeanor while testifying, any interest or bias he or she may have, and the reasonableness of his or her testimony considered in light of all the evidence in the case.

Consider, also, any relation each witness may bear to either side of the case, any bias or prejudice, the manner in which each witness might be affected by the verdict, and the extent to which each witness's testimony is either supported or contradicted by other evidence in the case.

Inconsistencies or discrepancies in the testimony of a witness or between the testimony of different witnesses may or may not cause you to discredit a witness's testimony. Two or more persons witnessing an incident or transaction may see or hear it differently. It is your duty to reconcile conflicting testimony, if you can.

In weighing the effect of a discrepancy consider whether it pertains to a matter of importance or to an unimportant detail and whether the discrepancy may result from innocent

error or intentional falsehood.

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You may give the testimony of each witness the amount of weight you think it deserves. You may believe all of it, part of it, or none of it at all. You do not have to accept the testimony of any witness, even if it is uncontradicted. It is for you to say what you believe and disbelieve.

In other words, what you must try to do in deciding credibility is to size up a witness in light of his or her demeanor, the explanations given, and all the other evidence in the case. Always remember that you should use your common sense and good judgment.

Impeachment of a witness:

A witness may be discredited or impeached by contradictory evidence by a showing that the witness testified falsely concerning a matter or by evidence that at some other time the witness said or did something inconsistent with the witness's present testimony.

It is your exclusive province to give testimony of each witness whatever degree of credibility or amount of weight you think it deserves. If you find that a witness testified

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untruthfully in some respect, you may consider that fact in deciding what credence to attach to other testimony from that witness.

Considering that fact, as well as all other relevant evidence, you may accept or reject testimony of the witness in whole or in part. In making this determination, you may consider whether the witness purposely made a false statement or merely made an innocent mistake, whether the inconsistency concerns an important fact or a small detail, and whether the witness had a reasonable explanation for the inconsistency.

Expert witnesses:

You have heard evidence from one witness, Dr. Robert Bancroft, who is known as an expert witness. An expert witness is a person who has special knowledge, experience, training, or education in his or her profession or area of study. Because of his expertise, an expert witness may offer an opinion about one or more of the issues in the case.

In evaluating the testimony of Dr. Bancroft in this case you should evaluate his credibility and statement just as you would

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for any other witness. You should also evaluate whether Dr. Bancroft's opinion is supported by the facts that have been proved and whether the opinion is supported by Dr. Bancroft's knowledge, experience, training, or education.

You are not required to give the testimony of Dr. Bancroft any greater weight than you believe it deserves just because he has been referred to as an expert witness.

Number of witnesses:

The fact that one side may have called more witnesses than the other side is of no significance. Your task is to evaluate the credibility of witnesses and to weigh all of the evidence.

Personal knowledge and experience of jurors:

In deliberating you are not expected to put aside your common sense, nor your own observations and life experience. However, a juror having special knowledge of a subject may neither state this knowledge to fellow jurors, nor act upon it himself or herself in arriving at a verdict. You must not tell your fellow jurors about matters that are based on your own

special knowledge concerning an issue in a case that did not come from the evidence received in the courtroom.

As jurors your job is to decide this case based solely on the evidence presented during the trial and my instructions to you. As you were instructed at the beginning of the trial, you are not to investigate or research the law or facts relevant to the trial.

I remind you that you must not seek or receive any information about this case from the internet, including Google, Facebook, Wikipedia, or any other websites or from any other source, including newspapers, magazines, law books or dictionaries. Do not search for or receive any information from the party, the lawyers, the witnesses, the evidence, the law, or any place or location mentioned in the trial.

Until I tell you that your jury service is completed, do not communicate with anyone, including your family and friends, about the evidence or issues in this case.

Burden of proof/preponderance of the evidence:

Because Dr. Porter is the one bringing

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this case, she has the burden of proof. She must prove each essential element of the claim she alleges by what is known as a preponderance of the evidence; i.e., the greater weight of the evidence.

To establish a fact by a preponderance of the evidence means to prove that the fact is more likely true than not. In other words, a preponderance of the evidence means evidence that, when considered and compared with the evidence opposed to it, has more convincing force and produces in your minds a belief that what is sought to be proved is more likely true than not true.

A preponderance of the evidence refers to the quality and persuasiveness of the evidence, not to the number of witnesses or documents.

In determining whether a claim has been proven by a preponderance of the evidence, you may consider the relevant testimony of all the witnesses regardless of who called them, and all exhibits received into evidence regardless perform who submitted them.

If you find that the credible evidence on an issue is evenly divided between the parties,

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you must decide that issue against the party having the burden of proof. That rule follows from the fact that the party bearing its burden must prove more than simple equality of evidence. He or she must prove the element at issue by a preponderance of the evidence.

On the other hand, the party with its burden of proof need prove no more than a preponderance. So long as you find that the scales tip, however slightly, in favor of the party with its burden of proof, meaning what that party claims is true is more likely true than not true, then that element will have been proven by a preponderance of the evidence.

If, after considering all the evidence, you are satisfied that Dr. Porter has carried her burden on at least one of the claims she alleges, then you must find for Dr. Porter on that, those claims.

On the other hand, if after such consideration you find the evidence to be in balance or equally probable, or if you find the evidence tips in favor of Dartmouth Health, then Dr. Porter has failed to sustain her burden and you must find for Dartmouth Health on those

claims.

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All persons equal before the law:

The fact that Dartmouth Health is a corporation and Dr. Porter is an individual must not enter into or affect your verdict. This case should be considered and decided by you as a dispute between parties of equal standing in the community. All persons, both corporations and individuals, stand equal before the law and are to be treated as equals in a court of justice.

Corporation acts through its employees:

Defendants Dartmouth Hitchcock Medical
Center, Dartmouth-Hitchcock Clinic, Mary
Hitchcock Memorial Hospital, and
Dartmouth-Hitchcock Health referred to
throughout this trial and in this document as
Dartmouth Health are corporate entities.

A corporation acts through its employees. Therefore, the act of a Dartmouth Health employee that occurred while he or she was on duty and acting within the scope of his or her employment duties shall be consider the act of Dartmouth Health.

Influenced decisionmaker:

An employee may be liable for unlawful acts even when so-called neutral decisionmakers made a final decision regarding the act if the employee proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the neutral decisionmaker relied on a supervisor who had an unlawful bias or retaliatory motive against the employees.

In other words, if you find that Dr. Merrens was the decisionmaker regarding the termination of Dr. Porter's employment without reassignment to another position at Dartmouth Health and if you find that Dr. Merrens did not personally have an unlawful bias or retaliatory motive against Dr. Porter, Dartmouth Health may nonetheless be held liable if you find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a supervisor of Dr. Porter's, like Dr. DeMars, had an unlawful bias or retaliatory motive to terminate Dr. Porter without reassignment to another position at Dartmouth Health and Dr. Merrens relied on that supervisor when deciding to terminate Dr. Porter's employment without reassignment to another position at Dartmouth Health.

Overview of claims:

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As you have seen and heard in this trial, this is an employment lawsuit brought by Dr. Misty Blanchette Porter against Dartmouth Health. Dr. Porter claims that she was terminated by Dartmouth Health because of her whistleblower complaints about conduct by other physicians and because of her disability.

Dartmouth Health claims it had

legitimate, non-discriminatory business reasons

for terminating employment of Dr. Porter in

conjunction with the closure of Dartmouth

Health's Reproductive, Endocrinology and

Infertility (REI) Division.

Now I will instruct you regarding each of Dr. Porter's claims; one, violation of the New Hampshire Whistleblowers' Protection Act; two, disability discrimination and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and the applicable laws of New Hampshire and Vermont; three, wrongful discharge under New Hampshire law; and, four, retaliation under the applicable laws of New Hampshire. I will also instruct you regarding Dartmouth Health's defenses and regarding damages.

New Hampshire Whistleblowers' Protection
Act. Dr. Porter alleges that she was terminated
by Dartmouth Health and was not reassigned to
another position at Dartmouth Health in
retaliation for her reporting about and/or
advising others to report about the conduct of
two physicians at Dartmouth Health that she
reasonably believed to be illegal, fraudulent,
unethical, or harmful to patients in violation
of New Hampshire's Whistleblowers' Protection
Act.

Dartmouth Health denies these claims and asserts that it had legitimate business reasons for its decision to terminate Dr. Porter's employment and not reassign her to another position with Dartmouth Health.

New Hampshire's Whistleblowers'

Protection Act prohibits employers from retaliating against an employee for reporting what he or she reasonably believes is a violation of the law. The act safeguards employees from being discriminated against for making a good faith report verbally or in writing.

Its purpose is to encourage employees to

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come forward and to report violations without fear of losing their jobs and to ensure that as many alleged violations as possible are resolved informally within the workplace.

In order to establish a claim under New Hampshire's Whistleblowers' Protection Act,
Dr. Porter must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence the following three elements:

First, Dr. Porter, in good faith, reported or caused to be reported what she had reasonable cause to believe was a violation of any law or rule adopted under the laws of New Hampshire, a political subdivision of New Hampshire or the United States.

Second, Dartmouth Health terminated

Dr. Porter's employment and failed to reassign

her to another job at Dartmouth Health.

And, third, there was causal connection between Dr. Porter's reporting and her termination from Dartmouth Health without reassignment to another job at Dartmouth Health.

One, reported in good faith.

In this context good faith means absence of malice and honesty of intention. Reporting in good faith means the employee reasonably

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believed that a violation of a law or a rule was happening. The employee did not prove that a violation of a law or rule was, in fact, happening.

In other words, the act does not require an actual violation of a law or rule but only that an employee reasonably believed that such a violation has occurred.

In regarding a violation to her employer, the employee is not required to reference any specific law or rule that the employer has allegedly violated. The employer is presumed to be familiar with the laws and regulations governing its business and to consider a report to have been made if a reasonable employer would have understood from an employee's complaint that the employee was reciting a violation of law.

Two, termination of employment. You must decide whether Dartmouth Health terminated

Dr. Porter's employment and did not reassign her to another job at Dartmouth Health.

Three, causal connection. To find in favor of Dr. Porter on this claim, you must find a causal connection between her termination and

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her reporting about and/or advising others to report about the conduct of two physicians at Dartmouth Health that she reasonably believed to be illegal, fraudulent, unethical, or harmful to patients.

In other words, you must find that

Dr. Porter's termination occurred because of her reporting. This may be shown by circumstantial evidence.

For example, you may find that there is sufficient causation through temporal proximity; that is, that Dartmouth Health's termination of Dr. Porter followed shortly after Dartmouth Health became aware of Dr. Porter's reporting.

Other ways you may find causation could be through, A, Dartmouth Health's disparate treatment of Dartmouth fellow employees who engaged in similar conduct as Dr. Porter or, B, deficiencies in Dartmouth Health's articulated reasons for terminating Dr. Porter.

In addition, to support the required finding of causation for this claim you must find that Dr. Porter reported the alleged violations to a person having supervisory authority over her.

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In other words, at least one supervisor or decisionmaker at Dartmouth Health must have known that Dr. Porter had reported about and had advised others to report about the conduct that she believed to be illegal, fraudulent, unethical, or harmful to patients.

Dartmouth Health claims it did not terminate Dr. Porter because of her whistleblowing activity; here, reporting that two Dartmouth Health physicians were engaging in conduct that she thought was unlawful, unethical, or dangerous to patients, but rather because it made a business decision to close its REI division, resulting in the termination of all three physicians in the division, and that there was no other position to which Dr. Porter could be reassigned at Dartmouth Health.

Dr. Porter asserts that the reasons given for her termination are not the true reasons but instead are a pretext or excuse to cover up Dartmouth Health's unlawful retaliation against her for whistleblowing.

If you do not believe the reasons that Dartmouth Health has offered for termination of Dr. Porter's employment and not reassigning her,

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then you may, but are not required to, infer that retaliation was a factor that made a difference in Dartmouth Health's decision to terminate Dr. Porter's employment and not reassign her to another job at Dartmouth Health.

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) claim.

In this case Dr. Porter claims that

Dartmouth Health terminated her employment and

did not reassign her to another division because

of her disability. Dr. Porter has reported

three distinct but related types of disability

discrimination claims.

First, Dr. Porter may prove that

Dartmouth Health would not have terminated her employment but for her disability.

Second, Dr. Porter may prove that

Dartmouth Health failed to reasonably

accommodate her disability by reassigning her to

another division instead of terminating her

employment.

Third, Dr. Porter may prove that

Dartmouth Health retaliated against her for

making a reasonable accommodation request.

You must determine whether Dr. Porter has

proven that Dartmouth Health discriminated against her because of her disability in any or all of these ways or none of these ways.

For Dr. Porter to prove her ADA claim against Dartmouth Health, she must prove that Dartmouth Health discriminated against her in at least one of these ways:

One, but-for discrimination. To prevail under this theory, Dr. Porter must prove all of the following by a preponderance of the evidence.

First: Dartmouth Health is an employer subject to the ADA.

Second: Dr. Porter has a disability within the meaning of the ADA.

Third: Dr. Porter was otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of her job, either with or without reasonable accommodation.

Fourth: Dr. Porter was terminated because of her disability.

To prevail under this theory Dr. Porter must prove all of the following by a preponderance of the evidence:

1.1. Employer. The parties have agreed

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on the first element that Dartmouth Health is an employer subject to the ADA. Thus, the first element is satisfied.

- 1.2. Disability. The parties have agreed on the second element; that Dr. Porter has a disability as defined by the ADA. Thus, the second element is satisfied.
- 1.3. Otherwise qualified to perform essential functions. You must determine whether Dr. Porter was a qualified individual to satisfy this element.

Dr. Porter must prove two things by a preponderance of the evidence. First, that she was otherwise qualified for the position she held and, second, that either with or without reasonable accommodation she could perform the essential functions of that position.

1.3.1. Otherwise qualified.

An individual is otherwise qualified if they have the requisite skill, experience, education, and other job-related requirements of the employment position involved in the case.

If Dr. Porter cannot satisfy this standard, then she is not a qualified individual, even if the reason that Dr. Porter

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is not qualified is solely a result of her disability. The ADA does not require an employer to hire or retain an individual who cannot perform the job in question, either with or without an accommodation.

1.3.2. Essential functions.

If you find that Dr. Porter was otherwise qualified, then the next step is to determine whether she has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that she was able to perform the essential functions of the position either with or without reasonable accommodation.

A reasonable accommodation may include job restructuring or part-time or modified work schedule. To make this determination, you will need to determine the essential functions of the employment position.

The essential functions of an employment position are the basic fundamental duties of a job that a person must be able to perform to hold a particular position. Essential functions do not include marginal job duties or position.

A job function may be considered essential for any of several reasons. These include but are not limited to the following.

One, the reason that the position exists is to perform that function; two, there are a limited number of employees available among whom the performance of that job function can be distributed; and, three, the job function is highly specialized, and the person in that position is hired for their expertise or ability to perform that particular job function.

In determining whether a particular job function is essential, you may, along with all of the evidence that has been presented to you, consider the following factors.

- A. The employer's judgment as to which functions of the job are essential.
- B. Written job instructions prepared by the employer for advertising or position.
- C. Written job instructions prepared by the employer for use in interviewing applicants for the position.
- D. The amount of time spent performing a function.
- E. The consequences of not requiring the person holding the position to perform the function.
 - F. The terms of any collective

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bargaining agreement.

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G. The work experience of the past employees who have held the position.

And H. The work experience of current employees who hold similar positions.

An employee must have been able to perform all of the essential functions of the position either with or without reasonable accommodation at the time of their termination.

An employer may not base an employment decision upon speculation that the employee's disability might worsen to the extent that they would not be a qualified individual at some time in the future.

On the other hand, an employer is not required to speculate that an employee's condition will improve if that employee is not able to fulfill all of the essential functions of the position at the time in question.

1.4. You must determine whether

Dartmouth Health terminated Dr. Porter's

employment because of her disability. An

employee must prove that the employer would not

have terminated their employment but for that

disability.

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To determine that Dartmouth Health terminated Dr. Porter because of her disability, you must decide that Dartmouth Health would not have terminated Dr. Porter had Dr. Porter not had a disability but everything else had been the same.

An employee does not need to prove that discrimination was the only or even the predominant factor that motivated an employer. You may decide that other factors were involved in the decision to terminate Dr. Porter's employment. But, for Dr. Porter to meet her burden, you must conclude that she has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that, although there may have been other factors, she would not have been terminated if she had not had a disability.

An employer may not discriminate against an employee because of the employee's disability. But an employer may terminate an employee for any other lawful reason, good or bad, fair or unfair. An employer is entitled to make subjective policy and business judgments, and an employer may therefore terminate an employee, even an outstanding employee, for

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reasons that it considers to be in its best interests. An employer is entitled to make its own personnel decisions, however misguided they may appear to you.

If you believe Dartmouth Health's reasons for its decision to terminate Dr. Porter and find that its decision was not because of Dr. Porter's disability, you must not substitute your own judgment, even if you do not agree with Dartmouth Health's decision.

As I have explained, Dr. Porter has the burden to prove that Dartmouth Health's decision to discharge her was because of her disability. I've explained to you that evidence can be direct or circumstantial. To decide whether Dartmouth Health's decision to discharge Dr. Porter was because of her disability, you may consider the circumstances of Dartmouth Health's decision.

For example, you may consider whether you believed the reasons Dartmouth Health gave for their decision. If you do not believe the reasons it gave for the decision, you may consider whether the reasons were so unbelievable that they are a coverup to hide the

161 true discriminatory reason for the decision. 1 2 Failure to grant reasonable accommodation request. 3 An employee may also establish a claim 4 5 under the ADA by showing that the employer failed to provide a reasonable accommodation. 6 To establish such a claim, Dr. Porter must prove 7 each of the following elements by a 8 9 preponderance of the evidence. 10 First: Dartmouth Health is an employer subject to the ADA. 11 Second: Dr. Porter has a disability 12 within the meaning of the ADA. 1.3 Third: Dr. Porter was otherwise 14 qualified to perform the essential functions of 15 her job, either with or without reasonable 16 accommodation. 17 Fourth: Dartmouth Health failed to make 18 a reasonable accommodation. 19 20 2.1. Employer. The parties have agreed on the first 21 22 element; that Dartmouth Health is an employer 23 subject to the ADA. Thus, the first element is 24 satisfied.

2.2. Disability.

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The parties have agreed on the second element; that Dr. Porter has a disability as defined by the ADA. Thus, the second element is satisfied.

2.3. Otherwise qualified to perform essential functions.

You must determine whether Dr. Porter was a qualified individual. To satisfy this element Dr. Porter must prove two things by a preponderance of the evidence. First, that she was otherwise qualified for the position she desired and, second, that either with or without reasonable accommodation she could perform the essential functions of that position.

2.3.1. Otherwise qualified.

An individual is otherwise qualified if they have the requisite skill, experience, education, and other job-related requirements of the employment position involved in the case.

If Dr. Porter cannot satisfy the standard, then she was not a qualified individual, even if the reason that Dr. Porter is not qualified is solely a result of her disability.

The ADA does not require an employer to hire or retain an individual who cannot perform

the job in question, either with or without a reasonable accommodation.

2.3.2. Essential functions.

If you find that Dr. Porter was otherwise qualified, then the next step is to determine whether she has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that she was able to perform the essential functions of the position either with or without reasonable accommodation.

A reasonable accommodation may include job restructuring or part-time or modified work schedules. To make this determination, you will need to determine the essential functions of the employment position.

The essential functions of an employment position are basic fundamental duties of a job that a person must be able to perform to hold a particular position. Essential functions do not include marginal job duties of a position.

A job function may be considered essential for any of several reasons. These include but are not limited to the following:

One. The reason that the position exists is to perform that function.

Two. There are a limited number of

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employees available among whom the performance of that job function can be distributed.

And 3. The job function is highly specialized, and the person in that position is hired for their expertise or ability to perform that particular job function.

In determining whether a particular job function is essential you may, along with all of the evidence that has been presented to you, consider the following factors.

One, the employer's judgment as to which functions of the job are essential. Sorry, that's i, not one.

- j. Written job descriptions prepared by the employer for advertising or posting new position.
- k. Written job descriptions prepared by the employer for use in interviewing applicants for the position.
- 1. The amount of time spent performing the function.
- m. The consequences of not requiring the person holding the position to perform the function.
 - n. The terms of any collective

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bargaining agreement.

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o. The work experience of past employees who have held position.

And p. The work experience of current employees who hold similar positions.

An employee must have been able to perform all of the essential functions of the desired position either with or without reasonable accommodation at the time of their termination.

An employer may not base an employment decision on speculation that the employee's disability might worsen to the extent that they would not be a qualified individual at some time in the future.

On the other hand, an employer is not required to speculate that an employee's condition will improve if that employee is not able to fulfill all of the essential functions of the position at the time in question.

2.4. Failed to make a reasonable accommodation.

You must determine whether Dartmouth

Health failed to make a reasonable accommodation

for Dr. Porter by reassigning her to another

department instead of terminating her employment.

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The term "reasonable accommodation" means making modifications to the workplace that allows a person with a disability to perform the essential functions of the job or allows a person with a disability to enjoy the same benefits and privileges as an employee without a disability.

A reasonable accommodation may include job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, or other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities. A reasonable accommodation does not require an employer to create a new position for an employee.

The term "reasonable accommodation" does not include efforts that can cause an undue hardship; an action requiring significant difficulty or expense on an employer. An employer must show special, typically case specific, circumstances to demonstrate undue hardship in a particular case.

An employer has a duty to make a reasonable accommodation for an employee if the

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employer knows or reasonably should have known that the employee was disabled, even if the employee did not explicitly request an accommodation.

If the employer knows or should have known that the employee was disabled, the employer is obligated to engage in an interactive process with the employee to determine whether a possible reasonable accommodation exists. Both employer and employee must cooperate with this interactive process in good faith.

Neither side can prevail in this case simply because the other did not cooperate in the interactive process. However, you may consider whether the party cooperated in good faith in evaluating the merit of that party's claim that a reasonable accommodation did or did not exist.

An employer, by failing to engage in any sufficient interactive process, risks not discovering means by which an employee's disability could have been accommodated and thereby increases the chance of failing to reasonably accommodate an employee.

3. Retaliation.

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The ADA prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee because the employee has opposed an unlawful employment practice under the ADA. This is called retaliation. To establish retaliation

Dr. Porter must prove each of the following elements by a preponderance of the evidence.

First: Dr. Porter engaged in activity protected by the ADA.

Second: Dartmouth Health knew that Dr. Porter engaged in protected activity.

Third: Dartmouth Health took adverse action against Dr. Porter.

Fourth: The causal connection exists between the adverse action and the protected activity.

3.1. Protected activity.

A protected activity is an act that opposes any perceived discriminatory practice made unlawful by the ADA. Protected activity includes making a request for a reasonable accommodation.

The parties have agreed on the first element; that Dr. Porter made a reasonable

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accommodation request. Thus, the first element is satisfied.

3.2. Aware of activity.

The parties have agreed on the second element; that Dartmouth Health was aware that Dr. Porter made a reasonable accommodation request seeking reassignment to the OB/GYN Department or the Radiology Department. Thus, the second element is satisfied.

3.3. Adverse action.

You must determine whether Dartmouth

Health took adverse action against Dr. Porter by
terminating her employment.

3.4. Causal connection.

You must determine whether there is a causal connection between Dr. Porter's reasonable accommodation request and Dartmouth Health's decision to terminate Dr. Porter's employment. Dr. Porter must prove that Dartmouth Health would not have terminated her employment but for her reasonable accommodation request.

To determine there is a causal connection between Dartmouth Health's decision to terminate Dr. Porter's employment and Dr. Porter's

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reasonable accommodation request, you must decide that Dartmouth Health would not have terminated Dr. Porter if Dr. Porter had not made a reasonable accommodation request but everything else had been the same.

Dr. Porter does not need to prove that retaliation was the only or even the predominant factor that motivated Dartmouth Health. You may determine that other factors contributed to Dartmouth Health's decision to terminate Dr. Porter's employment. But, in order to return a verdict in favor of Dr. Porter on her ADA retaliation claim, you must conclude that she has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that, even if other factors contributed to the decision, Dartmouth Health would not have terminated her employment if she had not made a reasonable accommodation request.

Rehabilitation Act claim.

Dr. Porter has already brought disability discrimination claims under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. Section 794.

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act applies to entities that receive federal funds, and it prohibits these entities from excluding or

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discriminating against individuals based on their disability.

Dr. Porter has brought claims for discriminatory termination, failure to make a reasonable accommodation, and retaliation under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The elements and instructions for these claims are the same as those under the ADA. Thus, the instructions I previously gave you on disability discrimination under the ADA apply equally to the claims under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.

Disability discrimination claims under New Hampshire state law.

In addition to the federal claims, there are also claims in this case for disability discrimination under New Hampshire's law against discrimination. New Hampshire state law prohibits discrimination in employment based on disability.

Dr. Porter has brought claims for discriminatory termination, failure to make a reasonable accommodation, and retaliation under the New Hampshire law against discrimination.

The elements and instructions for these claims

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are the same as those under the ADA. Thus, the instructions I previously gave you on disability discrimination under the ADA apply equally to the claims under the New Hampshire law against discrimination.

Disability discrimination claims under Vermont state law.

In addition to the federal claims and the claims under New Hampshire state law, there are also claims in this case for disability discrimination under Vermont's Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA). Vermont state law prohibits discrimination in employment based on disability.

Dr. Porter has brought claims for discriminatory termination, failure to make a reasonable accommodation, and retaliation under Vermont's FEPA. The elements and instructions for these claims are mostly the same as those under the ADA. However, there is one important difference in the claim for discriminatory termination.

For the fourth element the FEPA uses the "motivating factor" test instead of the "because of" test used under the ADA. For example,

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Dr. Porter must prove the following by a preponderance of the evidence:

First: Dartmouth Health is an employer subject to the FEPA.

Second: Dr. Porter has a disability within the meaning of FEPA.

Third: Dr. Porter was otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of her job, either with or without reasonable accommodation.

Fourth: Dr. Porter's disability was a motivating factor in Dartmouth Health's decision to terminate her employment.

Under the "motivating factor" test an employee must prove that their disability was a motivating factor that prompted the employer to terminate the employment. It is not necessary for the employee to prove that disability was the sole or exclusive reason for the employer's decision. It is sufficient if the employee proves that the alleged disability was a motivating factor in the employer's decision.

A motivating factor is a factor that played some part in an employer's adverse employment action. Under the "motivating

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factor" test an employer cannot avoid liability by proving that it would still have taken the same adverse action in the absence of discriminatory motivation. This is a difference between "motivating factor" test and the "because of" test.

You should apply the "motivating factor" test, not the "because of" test to Dr. Porter's claim for discriminatory termination under the FEPA. With this exception, the instructions I previously gave you on disability discrimination under the ADA regarding failure to make a reasonable accommodation and retaliation apply equally to the claims under the FEPA.

Wrongful discharge under New Hampshire law.

Based on Dartmouth Health's termination of Dr. Porter's employment at

Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center, Dr. Porter has brought a claim for wrongful discharge against Dartmouth Health under New Hampshire law.

The prevailing rule in New Hampshire is that where, as here, there is no employment contract between employer and employee, the

relationship is termed "at will".

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In an at-will employment situation both parties are generally free to terminate the employment relationship at any time with or without cause, and it is implied that the parties will carry out their obligations in good faith.

But there is an exception to this at-will rule. An employer termination of an employee that is motivated by bad faith or malice, or is based on retaliation, is not in the best interest of the economic system of the public good and is therefore unlawful. An employer's interest in running his business as he sees fit must be balanced against the interest of the employee in maintaining his employment and the public's interest in maintaining a proper balance between the two.

In order to establish a claim for wrongful discharge under New Hampshire law,

Dr. Porter must prove the following two elements by a preponderance of the evidence:

First: Dartmouth Health's termination of Dr. Porter was motivated by bad faith, malice, or retaliation.

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And, Second: Dartmouth Health terminated Dr. Porter because she performed one or more acts that public policy would encourage.

One. Termination motivated by bad faith, malice, or retaliation.

For purposes of this claim, bad faith is the equivalent of malice and may be established where, one, an employee is discharged for pursuing policies condoned by the employer; two, the record does not support the stated reason for the discharge; or, three, disparate treatment was administered to a similarly situated employee.

Bad faith can also be discerned from the course of events surrounding an employee's discharge, the manner in which the plaintiff was discharged, or shifting reasons for an employee's termination.

Stated another way, malice or bad faith may be shown where the employer's decision to terminate an employee was without reasonable cause or excuse as the facts would have appeared to a reasonable person and that the termination was willful and intentional. That is, the employer knew that the termination was

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unreasonable and still decided to terminate the employee's employment, or that the termination was motivated by ill will or a purpose to harass.

Bad faith or malice may therefore be established by proof that the evidence does not support the stated reason for the discharge.

The general meaning of retaliation is the act of doing someone harm in return for actual or perceived injuries or wrongs. In other words, revenge.

Two. Acts that public policy would encourage.

Public policy as used in this claim includes a wide range of society goals, including safety and public welfare, protection of an at-will's employee's promised compensation, and good faith reporting of reasonably perceived improper activity.

The employee need not show a strong and clear public policy, and the public policy may be based on statutory or non-statutory policies at the state or federal level. An employee's mere expression of disagreement with a management decision, however, is not an act

protected by public policy.

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Moreover, the public policy exception to termination of at-will employment does not deprive an employer of the right to make business decisions which are not necessary to effectuate the efficient and profitable operation of its business, nor does the public policy exception interfere with an employer's ability to hire and retain those individuals best qualified for the job.

An example of a case where an employee is terminated for doing an act that public policy would encourage is an employee being terminated for refusing to provide to his or her employer private medical reports and personal health information on patients.

The second example is an employee terminated for missing work because they reported to jury duty.

A third example is an employee being terminated for protecting employees who worked under him from workplace hazards that could cause serious physical harm to those employees.

Other examples of acts that public policy would encourage could be reporting physician

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conduct that's illegal, fraudulent, unethical, or unlawful to patients; ensuring that a medical provider or medical facility obtain patient consent before performing procedures on patients, and objecting to improper patient billing procedures. In these cases if the termination is because of the act that public policy encourages and the employer acted with malice and bad faith or in retaliation, the employee is entitled to recover damages for wrongful termination.

It is your job to determine if Dartmouth Health terminated Dr. Porter because of her performance of one or more acts that public policy would encourage. In determining whether Dr. Porter performed an act that public policy would encourage, you are not limited to the above examples, nor must you find that the facts support the above examples in this case.

In order to find in favor of Dr. Porter on this claim, you not only must find that Dr. Porter performed one or more acts that public policy would encourage and that Dartmouth Health's termination of Dr. Porter was motivated by bad faith, malice, and retaliation, you must

also find that Dr. Porter was terminated because of her performance of an act that public policy would encourage.

Thus, Dr. Porter must show a causal link between her performance of an act that public policy would encourage and her termination.

Damages.

If you decide in favor of Dartmouth
Health on all claims, you will not consider
these instructions about damages. But if you
decide for Dr. Porter on any claim, you must
determine the amount of money that will
compensate her for each item of harm that was
caused by Dartmouth Health's conduct. This
compensation is called damages.

Please keep in mind the following general principles as you deliberate. Remember that Dr. Porter has the burden of proving damages by a preponderance of the evidence. Damages may not be based on sympathy, speculation, or guesswork. In making your decision, you should be guided by the evidence, common sense, and your best judgment.

Economic and noneconomic damages.

Damages for Dr. Porter's claims can fall

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into two different categories; economic damages and noneconomic damages.

Economic damages includes such items as lost income and medical expenses. Non-economic damages include such items as lost enjoyment of life, mental anguish, pain and suffering, disability, and disfigurement. These damages may include compensation for past harm and future harm, depending on the evidence. If you find that Dr. Porter is entitled to damages, you must determine the total amount and place that amount on the verdict form.

There is no precise standard for calculating these damages. Your damages determination must be just and reasonable in light of the evidence. In determining the damages that Dr. Porter has suffered as a result of her injuries, you should consider the following items:

Dr. Porter is entitled to damages for any earnings lost in the past and any probable loss of ability to earn money in the future caused by Dartmouth Health's conduct. When considering Dr. Porter's future earnings, you should consider Dr. Porter's expected working lifetime.

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Dr. Porter is entitled to damages for any lost enjoyment of life, mental anguish, and pain and suffering caused by Dartmouth Health's conduct. These damages may include any pain, discomfort, fears, anxiety, humiliation, lost enjoyment of life's activities, and any other mental and emotional distress suffered by her in the past or likely to be suffered in the future.

Mitigation of damages.

Dartmouth Health claims that Dr. Porter has failed to mitigate, or minimize, her damages. A plaintiff ordinarily has a general duty to mitigate the damages she incurs, meaning she has a duty to take steps to try to minimize the harm or prevent it from increasing further. In this context, that means Dr. Porter has a duty to attempt to secure or to secure employment that is a suitable alternative to her employment at Dartmouth Health. This duty applies only to those damages that Dr. Porter could have avoided with reasonable effort and without undue risk, burden, or expense, as the duty to mitigate requires only reasonable, practical care and diligence, not extraordinary measures.

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The burden is on Dartmouth Health to prove this affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence. As part of bearing this burden, Dartmouth Health must present evidence not only that Dr. Porter did not make reasonable efforts to obtain employment but also that suitable work existed. To sustain its burden Dartmouth Health must present concrete evidence. Mere speculation is not sufficient.

If you find that Dr. Porter failed to mitigate her damages, you must reduce her award of damages, if any, by the amount you find she could have avoided.

Punitive damages.

Punitive damages are meant to punish a party for its clearly outrageous conduct and to stop others from acting similarly in the future. In order to award punitive damages, you must find two things.

First, you must find that Dartmouth

Health's wrongful conduct was outrageously

reprehensible. That is, that the conduct,

whether acts or failures to act, was egregious,

morally deserving of blame, to a degree of

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outrage frequently associated with a crime.

Second, you must find that Dartmouth
Health acted with malice. You may find malice
if you find that Dartmouth Health's
reprehensible conduct was intentional and
deliberate. That is, that the conduct was the
result of Dartmouth Health's bad motive, ill
will, or personal spite or hatred toward
Dr. Porter. You may also find malice even if
Dartmouth Health's motivation behind the
intentional, outrageous conduct was to benefit
itself rather than to harm Dr. Porter.

Alternatively, you may find malice if
Dartmouth Health's wrongful conduct was not
intentional but instead was done with a reckless
or wanton disregard of the substantial
likelihood that it would cause egregious harm to
Dr. Porter. That is, if Dartmouth Health acted
or failed to act with conscious and deliberate
disregard of a known, substantial, and
intolerable risk of harm to Dr. Porter, with the
knowledge that the conduct was substantially
certain to result in the threatened harm.

Where the defendant is a corporation, as is the case here, in order to find that the

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corporation must pay punitive damages you must find that conduct justifying punitive damages was corporate conduct or was conduct permitted by a corporation.

Where the management of the corporation was involved in the conduct itself, it may be considered to be corporate conduct. Where the management of the corporation has knowledge of wrongful conduct by lower-level employees, the corporation may be determined to have permitted the conduct.

If you find either corporate conduct or conduct permitted by the corporation, you may find the corporation must pay punitive damages.

In determining the amount of punitive damages to award, if any, you may consider such factors as the nature of Dartmouth Health's conduct, the nature of the resulting harm to Dr. Porter, Dartmouth Health's wealth or financial status, and the degree of malice or wantonness in its acts.

Remaining damages issues.

It is solely the province of the jury to decide the amount of any damages award. I am giving you these damages instructions so you

will know how to proceed if you reach this point in your deliberations. But by giving you these instructions I do not intend to suggest that an award is appropriate or what the amount of that award should be.

Where the amount of damages can be calculated in specific dollar terms, the parties seeking damages must present evidence to demonstrate the appropriate amount. With certain types of damages, however, there is no precise measurement, and it is up to you to decide what is fair monetary compensation for those damages. Under no circumstances may you award damages that are speculative or conjectural.

I remind you that any amount of recovery that may have been suggested by the attorneys is not evidence. Moreover, you need not adopt the approaches the attorneys have suggested for calculating damages. As the jury it is your obligation to arrive at an amount which is supported by the evidence and fair to both parties. The amount of damages, if any, is a determination for the jury.

You should not add any sum for interest

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to the damages awarded in this case. The Court will make such award, if appropriate.

Similarly, you must not include in your reward any costs that Dr. Porter may or may not have incurred due to her filing of this lawsuit or her attorney's fees. These are matters for the Court.

You should not award damages for one item that duplicates an award for another item. In other words, a party is entitled to only one recovery for his or her damages.

Insurance and taxes.

You should not speculate about whether

Dartmouth Health or Dr. Porter has any insurance
that might cover or has covered any damages that
you find Dr. Porter has experienced. You also
should not speculate about what taxes Dr. Porter
might owe on any damage award.

You have heard testimony from

Dr. Bancroft that Dr. Porter's damages include

amounts owed in taxes on any damages award. You

may or may not take this into account in

assessing the amount of Dr. Porter's damages, if

any.

The rules that jurors are not to

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speculate about insurance and taxes are special rules that apply to lawsuits. Those issues are not relevant to your task here. Your job is to award the amount of damages that you determine has been established by the evidence presented to you. Any other issues that have to be resolved are my job, not yours.

Final instructions.

This completes my instructions to the jury. I will now provide a copy of these instructions to you -- you already have a copy -- and you will retire to the jury room to deliberate in privacy about the issues in this case.

I will also provide a verdict form to guide you in your deliberations. The answer to each question on the form must be the unanimous answer of the jury. This means you cannot answer a question on the verdict form unless and until all 12 of you agree on the answer. Each question Numbered 1 through 6 must be answered.

You will also receive the exhibits which are admitted into evidence.

I appoint Kattie Lafontaine as your foreperson. She will be responsible for making

sure that deliberations occur in an orderly fashion and that every juror has an opportunity to participate.

She will record the unanimous answers of the jury on the verdict form and date and sign the jury form. She will also be your spokesperson here in court.

If you need to communicate with the Court, please do so in writing. I will then confer with the lawyers about your question and send a written response to you.

Please advise the court officer after you reach a verdict but do not tell the court officer or anyone else what the verdict is until you return to the courtroom, at which time I will receive the verdict form from your foreperson.

So that concludes the instructions. At this time I'll ask that the jury retire to the deliberation room, and the exhibits will be provided to you for your consideration of the case.

THE CLERK: All rise for the jury.

(The jury left the courtroom at 2:13 p.m.)

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190 THE CLERK: Please be seated. 1 THE COURT: Okay, so at this time I'll 2 take any objections from the parties to the 3 instructions as given. 4 MR. JONES: Only with regard to the issue 5 with regard to New Hampshire enhanced 6 7 compensatory damages, renewing that issue. THE COURT: Yes, okay. Thank you. 8 Mr. Schroeder? 9 10 MR. SCHROEDER: Your Honor, not to review 11 all the previously stated on objections related 12 to the jury instructions, included but not limited to the instructions regarding the ADA, 1.3 14 reassignment to a vacant position, we incorporate herein all of the prior objections 15 that we've stated on the record. 16 17 THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you. Anything else from either side at this 18 19 point? 20 MR. SCHROEDER: Just logistics, your 21 Honor. 22 THE COURT: Yes. MR. SCHROEDER: Where you would like us 23 to remain? What's the assigned period? How 24 close you would like us to remain? Just your 25

general decorum rules on that.

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THE COURT: I think so long as Mr. Howe has cellphones, contact information for you. Cellphone I think probably is the best. You certainly don't have to stay here in the courtroom. You can leave the building certainly, but as long as you can be back in a five- to ten-minute time period if you do get a call from me about a note, that would be fine.

MR. SCHROEDER: Should we report back here at 4:30 or -- well, you tell us.

THE COURT: Right. So I don't -- you know, I haven't spoken to them.

Well, I haven't spoken to them about that, about how long they want to deliberate for. As I mentioned to you this morning, I probably should mention that to them at this time, so that will answer your question.

So I'll ask for the jury to be brought back in so I can speak to them about that.

THE CLERK: All rise for the jury.

(The jury entered the courtroom at

2:15 p.m.)

THE CLERK: Please be seated.

THE COURT: So you may be wondering how

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long you would be deliberating. That's up to you ultimately, but in terms of how far you go into the evening it's up to you.

If you would like to deliberate past, say the 4:30 cutoff time, that's entirely up to you; whatever decision you make in that regard.

If as a group you determine to stop deliberating at any point in time this evening, I'd ask that you provide a note to the court security officer advising me that that is what you intend to do, and then I'll bring you back into court briefly to speak to you before you leave for the evening.

And then if your deliberations carry over until tomorrow, then 9 a.m. if you would come back to court and report to the jury room as you always have, and you will not be seeing us or the attorneys during your deliberations. Okay?

Any issues that arise during your deliberations, as I say, provide a note to the court security officer, and it will be taken up here.

Okay. Thank you.

THE CLERK: All rise for the jury.

(The jury left the courtroom at

BENTLEY COURT REPORTING

193 2:17 p.m.) 1 THE CLERK: Please be seated. 2 THE COURT: So, having said that, I don't 3 know that I'll direct you to come back at 4:30 4 because it may be too early, it may be too late. 5 I'll let you -- who knows, so we'll be in touch 6 7 with you. MR. SCHROEDER: Thank you, your Honor. 8 9 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 10 (The jury started their deliberations at 2:18 p.m.) 11 12 (A note was received from the jury, and the following is in open court without the jury 1.3 present at 4:31 p.m.) 14 THE COURT: Okay, so we received a note, 15 and I'm going to read the note to you. It's 16 written by the foreperson, and it simply reads: 17 We collectively would like to leave at 18 19 4:30 p.m. tonight. 20 So I called you back to let you know that, and now I'm going to call the jury in and 21 22 I'm going to honor their request. (The jury entered the courtroom at 23 4:32 p.m.) 24 THE COURT: Okay, so I received your 25

194 note, and I shared the contents of the note with 1 2 counsel. So, of course, you can leave at 4:30 tonight. 3 So as you know, you are in deliberations 4 5 now so really now, more than ever, it's absolutely critical that you not talk to anyone 6 about the case or take in any other information 7 about the case or let anyone talk to you about 8 9 the case. You shouldn't speak to family or 10 friends, court officers; no one about the case. 11 So you'll return tomorrow at 9 a.m., and 12 please remember that you cannot resume deliberations unless everyone is present. Okay? 1.3 All right. Well, have a good evening. 14 THE CLERK: All rise for the jury. 15 (The jury left the courtroom at 16 4:33 p.m.) 17 THE COURT: I'm assuming we're all good 18 19 at this point? 20 (All counsel nodded their heads.) THE COURT: All right. Have a good 21 22 evening. 23 (End of court proceedings on April 8, 24 2025, at 4:33 p.m.) 25

CERTIFICATE

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I, SARAH M. BENTLEY, Certified Court Reporter, Registered Professional Reporter and Notary Public, do hereby certify that the said proceedings were taken in machine shorthand by me at the time and place aforesaid and were thereafter reduced to typewritten form under my direction, Pages 1 - 195; that the foregoing is a true, complete, and correct transcript of said proceedings.

I further certify that I am not employed by, related to, nor counsel for any of the parties herein, nor otherwise interested in the outcome of this litigation.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have affixed my signature and seal this 31st day of May, 2025.

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/s/ Sarah M. Bentley, RPR 19 SARAH M. BENTLEY, CCR-B-1745 20

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